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In the first paper of this dissertation, I lay out in a uniform, quantifiable manner a 
framework for examining the regulations and policies surrounding social safety net programs. By 
creating a database of laws and procedures surrounding SNAP, TANF, and Medicaid, it is then 
possible to examine and compare those rules using quantitative methods. In the second paper, I 
do this by aggregating in two different ways the rules in the database that were generated in the 
first paper: by averaging them into an index and by using factor analysis. Although the factor 
analysis models are a poor fit, an examination of the averaged scores for each state over the 
period shows that generosity is increasing in almost every state over time. In the third paper, I 
use the index from the second paper as an explanatory variable in a mixed-effects model to 
examine maternal mortality in the United States from 2005 to 2012. By using the index as an 
independent variable, I meant to uncover the effects of safety net generosity on maternal 
mortality in each state for each year. The results of this analysis show that, although the three 
individual programs do not demonstrate an effect of maternal mortality on their own, the 
combination of the three programs into a safety net or a package of programs does improve 
mortality. Although this is true for the entire population and for White women, Black maternal 
mortality does not reflect the population-wide results, indicating that more specific analysis by 
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The purpose of this dissertation was to develop a conceptual framework and metrics on 
the generosity of social assistance in each state. In the third paper of this dissertation, I hope to 
evaluate the impact of that assistance climate on a specific public health outcome, severe 
maternal morbidity. The rules and regulations passed by states with respect to federally financed, 
means-tested, social safety net programs provide an ideal opportunity for comparative analysis. 
The programs selected for analysis are the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), 
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) and Medicaid. These three means-tested 
federal programs vary in generosity across states.  
One major contribution of this dissertation is that in it I created an aggregate measure of 
social safety net generosity and applied that measure to population health outcomes. The purpose 
of creating this database of rules was ultimately to generate a measure of generosity that would 
serve as an explanatory variable in quantitative statistical models. Public health scholars 
certainly acknowledge the influence of federal and state government policies on individual and 
population health, but the researchers who have examined these effects have rarely 
instrumentalized this input in a sophisticated way. Too often, public health analysts have relied 
on reductive measures of government policy (e.g., fiscal expenditures, date of implementation or 
number of people affected). The problem with these measures is that they have failed to account 
for small variation in policy regulations across states. Implementation and population numbers 
are simple black-and-white instruments that are used to determine whether a policy affects 
someone or whether it does not, while expenditures cannot distinguish where and how public 
 
 2 
monies are spent. This means that high levels of direct cash assistance can look identical to 
meager cash assistance coupled with high administrative costs.  
Therefore, I have aimed to bridge that divide between sophisticated methodologies that 
look at policies, but not outcomes, and the more basic attempts to understand policy effects on 
public health, using crude measures of those policies. The construction of a generosity index (or 
generosity scale) to measure the provision of the social safety net builds on the traditions of 
policy analysis and political science. However, the application of that measure, to answer 
questions about the effects of the social safety net on population health outcomes, represents a 
development in the area of more traditional public health analyses of population health.  
In the first paper of the dissertation, I aggregate the rules governing these programs in 
each state into a policy database that scores each rule numerically. The resulting database of 
rules and regulations that govern these programs is used for a variety of analyses. In the second 
paper, I aggregate the database of rules into a single measure of generosity. First, I create a rough 
generosity index by averaging together the numerical scores in the database. I use a more 
advanced statistical technique to transform the database into a generosity scale. Confirmatory 
factor analysis is performed on three hypothesized models of how underlying generosity might 
manifest in program regulations. Finally, in the third paper, I select a measure of generosity 
(from among those created) to be used as an explanatory variable in the analysis of adverse 
maternal birth outcomes.  
The goal is to show that state social safety can determine population health outcomes. 
Although administrative or regulatory changes to programs can seem technical rather than 
impactful, they represent more than bureaucratic red tape. The rules and regulations governing 
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the provision of the social safety net affect can have real consequences on public health, and 





PAPER 1: ASSESSING GENEROSITY IN STATE POLICIES:1 THE SOCIAL SAFETY 
NET AS AN UNDERLYING DETERMINANT OF THE PUBLIC’S HEALTH 
Section 1.1 Generosity and the Social Safety Net 
To date, scholars in the fields of public policy, public administration, and political 
science that take advantage of more sophisticated methodologies have tended to present policies 
and regulations as an output, rather than as an input. Techniques such as principle components 
analysis or cluster analysis have been extended from their social science origins in sociology, 
education, and psychometrics to the fields of public policy or political science, but this is 
generally as far as the extension goes. These analytic techniques and their results are the products 
of such studies, but rarely do authors go beyond that analysis to use these products in other ways.  
In this paper, I examine variations in the generosity of three major federal social safety 
net programs—income support (TANF), food assistance (SNAP), and health care (Medicaid)—
combining the eligibility for and the value of these safety net benefits into a combined generosity 
score for each state. In Section 1.2, I provide a methodological justification for carrying out the 
aggregation of various state rules; In Section 1.3, I describe the methods and procedures used to 
quantify welfare generosity in state law from 2000 to 2016, coding laws across key social 
assistance programs in all 50 states and Washington, D.C., according to their eligibility criteria, 
benefit levels, and program administration. Situating this study in the broader framework of 
social determinants of health, in Section 1.4, I describe the role of social policy in influencing 
                                               
1 Much of this paper comes from an unpublished manuscript coauthored with Ben Meier, Yuna Kim, and Ashley 




population health, providing a basis to assess the impact of law on the public’s health. In Section 
1.5, I describe the limitations of the current analysis and the possible future applications for the 
process before I ultimately conclude that coding state laws provides a path to assess empirically 
the impact of social safety net rules on population health in the Unites States. 
To give substance to the concept of “Health in all Policies,” evidence of the impact of 
social policies on health outcomes is critical. I hypothesized that higher state welfare generosity 
across states and changes in generosity over time would be associated with public health 
indicators (especially the infant health indicators that are most sensitive to economic inequality). 
Controlling for state sociodemographic characteristics (e.g., empirical assessment of state 
welfare generosity) can contribute to understanding of the legal factors that give rise to vast 
health inequalities across the American states. State welfare programs have faced a series of 
retrenchments since the 1990s2; therefore, evidence to support the public health benefits of state 
welfare law could support renewed attention to safety net programs and social welfare spending. 
It is necessary to measure facets of state laws to assess social welfare generosity. With 
many social policy decisions delegated to the states, the United States is often referred to as a 
collection of numerous semiautonomous social safety nets, rather than as a single, federal 
welfare state. This is the danger of living in a federal system in which decisions about social 
policy are devolved from the national level: What one gets depends on where one lives 
(Michener, 2018). Policy determinants of health are not uniform for all Americans when even 
decisions about federal assistance programs are delegated to states; divergences in these 
programs are seen most principally in state rules regarding TANF, SNAP, and Medicaid. 
                                               
2 One of the largest retrenchments occurred in the 1996 when the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity 
Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) eliminated the entitlement to cash assistance, required recipients of cash assistance 
to meet new work requirements, and instituted lifetime time limits on participation in the welfare program. 
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Section 1.2 Methodological Justification 
Given the myriad rules governing program eligibility and social benefits, these laws 
obscure researchers’ abilities to assess the comparative generosity of states social welfare 
systems. Although the authors of legal epidemiology studies have begun to compare individual 
policy and program variation across states, no previous researcher has comprehensively 
examined the range of programs that collectively determine welfare generosity. Through the 
development of a composite “generosity scale,” it is possible to assess the combined generosity 
of a state social welfare system: “Measurement instruments that are collections of items 
combined into a composite score and intended to reveal levels of theoretical variables [that are] 
not readily observable by direct means are often referred to as scales” (DeVellis, 2012, p. 11). 
Using the resulting scores as indicators of underlying generosity, I was able to analyze this scale 
measure in combination with state public health outcomes, providing a basis to assert that there 
is a legal foundation for variations in health status across states in that legal and regulatory 
decisions surrounding public assistance programs serve as an accurate proxy for generosity. 
The aggregation of a large number of programs or program rules into a single analysis is 
not a novel idea. The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) has created its own SNAP Policy 
Index to measure the relative generosity of SNAP policies by state from year to year (USDA, 
Economic Research Service [ERS], n.d.; Stacy, Tiehen, & Marquardt, 2018). However, the 
SNAP index can only illuminate what is happening in one program, whereas the assistance 
actually rendered to the public depends on many programs. In this way, it makes sense to think 
of a “package” of policies that constitute the safety net and provide support in concert with one 
another. Meyers, Gornick and Peck (2001) recognized this in conceiving of a “package of 
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support” designed to assist low-income families; their package was made up of 10 different 
programs and policies, all of which provided some type of assistance to families in need.  
The analysis that I present likewise creates an index from more than one welfare program 
because assistance for those in need does not come from only a single source. Furthermore, it is 
of limited use to look only at the effects of a single program or policy. “Social policies at the 
state-level can be thought of as a portfolio of programs” (Meyers et al., 2001, p. 459); therefore, 
any attempt to determine how social assistance differs across jurisdictions must take into account 
the array of assistance programs. It is possible that states can increase generosity in one area, 
while simultaneously decreasing it in another. Failure to account for both of these changes would 
miss important information.  
Section 1.3 Creating the Database of Social Safety Net Rules 
Three different federal programs are included in the package of policies that I used to 
construct the generosity measure; all of these programs are means-tested, meaning that they 
target low-income households. They are all funded in full or in part by the federal government, 
but the administration of the programs, provision of the benefits, and many decisions about 
program policy are devolved to the state, and even to county or local authorities in some 
instances. One of the consequences of a federal system is variation across subentitites, for better 
or for worse. Although the programs included in the scale are authorized under federal 
legislation, administrative practices, provision of services, and even the eligibility requirements 
and benefits provided can vary wildly by jurisdiction, leading to very different experiences for 
similarly situated people who reside in different states, signifying a lack of “horizontal equity” 
(David, Smeeding, & National Bureau of Economic Research, 1985; Michener, 2018).  
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Although all three of the programs chosen for inclusion are federal programs, they are 
largely administered at a state level or under state supervision, and they vary accordingly. 
Beyond the federal floor required of each state, information about variation in income eligibility 
thresholds, I gathered categorical eligibility requirements, enrollment or reenrollment rules, 
conditional requirements, time limits, program-specific considerations, and benefit amounts.  
TANF is the program that is known as “welfare” in the American context. It was 
reformed in 1996 from the former Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) with the 
passage of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA), at 
which point it became a block grant program with greater control delegated to states. The 
program provides low-income families with cash assistance and certain in-kind or subsidized 
services such as childcare (Weaver, 2002, 2014). Data on the TANF program comes from the 
Urban Institute’s (n.d.) Welfare Rules Database, a comprehensive collection of rules and policies 
compiled annually from each state’s policy manual. Data are available from 1998 through 2016 
for all 50 states and Washington, D.C. (Urban Institute, n.d.).  
SNAP, formerly known as the food stamp program, provides poor individuals with 
money redeemable for qualifying food products at participating retailers. The least variable of all 
three programs, traditional SNAP eligibility requirements are generally decided at the federal 
level; however, states have some flexibility in program administration and have the option to 
confer eligibility on those receiving certain other social services (Aussenberg, 2018; Aussenberg 
& Falk, 2019; USDA, Food and Nutrition Service [FNS], 2018;). SNAP is a program run by the 
FNS within the USDA, and data regarding state policies were obtained directly from the 
department’s own database (USDA, ERS, n.d.).  
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Medicaid is government-subsidized healthcare for low-income individuals. Although 
means-tested in all cases, eligibility varies widely across states in terms of both income 
thresholds and categorical eligibility status. Data on Medicaid also include information on the 
State Children’s Health Insurance (S-CHIP or CHIP) program, for some states cover low-income 
children whose families are ineligible for Medicaid through this program. Data regarding 
Medicaid policies and regulations come from the Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation (n.d.a, 
n.d.b) that maintains a database on Medicaid benefits and an annual report on Medicaid and 
CHIP eligibility. The data on Medicaid eligibility for immigrants was obtained from the Urban 
Institute’s (2017) State Immigration Policy Resource. Although certain services are mandatory, 
meaning that states must provide coverage, decisions about copays mean that the functional 
coverage offered—even for mandatory benefits—can vary by state (Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services, n.d.).  
An additional means-tested assistance program for new and expectant mothers living near 
or below the poverty line is the Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants and 
Children (WIC) program (Aussenberg, 2017). A large-scale public health intervention aimed at 
improving maternal and child health (MCH) outcomes, WIC is a federal program administered at 
the state-level; however, it was ultimately excluded from the welfare generosity scale because 
variation (especially across states) was so small as to be rendered meaningless when entered into 
calculations for the scale. The major exception to this variation arises because of “adjunctive 
income eligibility,” meaning that individuals who are categorically eligible (pregnant, 
postpartum, or breastfeeding women, and infants and children through Age 5), but do not meet 
the federal income threshold of 185% of the federal poverty line (FPL), are considered income 
eligible regardless because they participate in another assistance program (Medicaid, SNAP, or 
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TANF, or some state assistance programs at the discretion of the state’s WIC agency). Although 
states do have different income thresholds for these programs, the implementation of this policy 
has only minimal effect on program participation (Carlson, Neuberger, & Rosenbaum, 2017). 
Furthermore, the varying income thresholds are captured in items pertaining to those programs; 
therefore, the inclusion of WIC is redundant.  
In gathering the information on the programs included in the policy package, I looked at 
programs across space and time. Longitudinal (i.e., panel) data is required to observe differences 
not only between states, but also within states over time, and to observe trends in between state 
differences over time. Therefore, only variables that varied over time and space were chosen. 
Variables with insufficient variation were excluded from the database because they are 
unchanging; therefore, they would be invisible once aggregated into a broader measure of 
generosity. Generosity is a latent variable; therefore, the numbers assigned to it have no inherent 
value; therefore, I sought only to determine a state-year’s relative position to other state-years 
(Bollen, 2014). Inclusion of these static variables within the scale might well change the absolute 
values of its score, but would not affect the relative values.  
In creating a welfare generosity measure, it was necessary to create a database of 
administrative practices, regulations, eligibility rules, and benefits for each program. Generosity 
can vary in a number of ways; a state that covers fewer individuals, but provides greater 
assistance to them could be considered equally generous as a state that covers a large number of 
people, but provides a much smaller benefit. In addition to decisions about coverage, generosity 
also can manifest through program regulations and the degree of bureaucratic red tape that a 
person would encounter; thus, states that require recipients to jump through many hoops to 
 
 8 
receive aid could be thought of as less generous owing to a higher degree of administrative 
exclusion (Brodkin & Majmundar, 2010). 
Variables were created according to the information available from the named sources. 
Variables were most often ordinal, with higher values always corresponding to a more generous 
policy. Categories were established according to observed patterns in the data; no categories 
were created that included few or no observations. Cutoffs and categories were created to 
represented meaningful distinctions according to where the observations actually lay. Binary 
variables, especially those indicating whether a state had a particular policy or exemption, were 
coded so that the higher value indicated the more generous answer, regardless of whether the 
response to the question was “yes” or “no.” Continuous variables were treated in the same way: 
if the more generous state-year would have a lower value for a particular item, that item was 
recoded so that a higher value again indicated a more generous policy. For each program, the 
following categories were identified, observed, and measured, using a coding scheme in which 
higher values designated policies that are relatively “more generous:” 
Income eligibility thresholds are limits imposed by each program on an individual’s or 
household’s income and assets, representing who is considered poor enough to apply for means-
tested aid. States that are more “generous” are those that allow those who have a higher income 
to receive assistance, and that increase this income threshold because of certain types of 
assistance units (e.g., those with an elderly or disabled member). States that are more generous 
also set a higher asset limit or allow more exclusions, which means that they exclude the value of 
certain items or possessions when calculating someone’s total assets. Some states have even 




Categorical eligibility, in contrast, does not refer to the income of the applicant or 
recipient, but to their status as a member of a category eligible for a particular program. These 
requirements often refer to categories such as citizenship status, household composition, or age. 
Although immigrants are prohibited generally from receiving aid in their first 5 years in the 
country under federal regulations, states can use their own funds to cover these individuals and 
they can decide whether to cover them and what categories of immigrants should receive the 
coverage after the 5-year federal interdiction expires. Pregnant women also are treated as a 
separate category for the purposes of eligibility for TANF and Medicaid; states vary in what 
month an expectant mother becomes eligible for a program or becomes eligible under less 
stringent conditions. TANF allows states to decide on their treatment of minor parents and 
whether they will allow two-parent households to receive assistance and, if so, under what 
conditions. States that allow more people in a category to apply for aid (e.g., allowing pregnant 
women who would otherwise be ineligible to qualify for Medicaid early on in pregnancy) are 
more generous. In addition, SNAP and Medicaid vary by state in their treatment of single adults, 
or able-bodied adults without dependents.  
Application burden consists of the rules governing how difficult a state makes it to sign 
up for benefits. More red tape or bureaucratic procedures can be seen as increasing the cost of 
applying for assistance, even if the cost is not necessarily monetary. Hurdles to enrollment 
actually decrease the number of people who apply and are accepted; therefore, states that make it 
easier to enroll or reenroll are coded as more generous. For example, a state that allows broad-
based categorical eligibility (BBCE) for SNAP is more generous because a potential recipient 
does not need to prove that their income is low enough; this is presumed to be the case because 
they are currently in receipt of another form of aid. Ease of the application process also 
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influences generosity (e.g., telephone interviews instead of in-person interviews, which are easier 
and therefore more generous). 
Conditional requirements refer to the conditions that a recipient must meet or actions 
they must take in order to (continue to) receive aid. Requirements can include certain behavioral 
things like immunizations and low school absenteeism for the children of TANF participants; 
however, the most significant requirements are work requirements and their exemptions. States 
that allow more activities to be classified as work (or that exempt more categories of people from 
these requirements) are considered more generous. States with fewer conditions to be met, and 
states with less severe sanctions for failure to comply, were coded as more generous. 
Benefit limits refer policies that restrict access (e.g., the TANF lifetime limit imposed by 
PRWORA, state-specific lifetime limits, and spell limits). PRWORA limits families who receive 
federal funds to a maximum of 5 years (60 months) of TANF aid throughout their lifetime. Prior 
to the passage of PRWORA, some states applied for federal waivers to their AFDC programs 
and introduced time limits on what was at the time an entitlement program. With the law’s 
passage in 1996, all states had to implement a 5-year time limit, unless they chose to use their 
own funds. States can individually choose limits that apply to state funds, rather than federal 
funds. They could also choose to implement a shorter time limit than 5 years. Spell limits refer to 
the maximum number of consecutive months a household can receive aid, and the existence of a 
spell limit is considered less generous. With both lifetime and spell limits, the longer the period, 
the more generous a state is. TANF family cap policies (which limit or prohibit additional 




Benefits or benefit amounts refer to the actual aid that is given to recipients. This refers to 
the maximum cash benefit allowed to a household under the state’s policies; it also refers to the 
way in which benefits are received. For TANF recipients, cash payments are considered more 
generous than in-kind goods, vendor payments, or services. When SNAP benefits are rendered as 
EBT (electronic benefits transfer), a state can be considered relatively more generous because 
this benefit eases the process of using the benefits and reduces possible stigma. For Medicaid, 
the number and type of services covered contribute to a state’s generosity level. For services 
whose coverage is mandatory under federal law, generosity is determined according to whether a 
state requires a copay.  
The creation of the data used in generating a scale was a process in which I took all of the 
relevant variables from the sources mentioned and combined them into a single database that was 
organized by state and by year. Three different sources were used for the three programs of 
interest; therefore, not every year since 1996 had data for all three of the programs. I used the 
years in common in all three sources, 2000–2016.  
A number of the variables already existed in binary or categorical format. In these cases, 
it was simply a matter of ensuring that the coding scheme would work out so that higher values 
would indicate more generosity and recoding the variables accordingly. A variable that indicated 
whether a state implemented spell limits on TANF assistance would need to be recoded so that a 
value of 0 indicated that they do implement these limits, while a value of 1 would indicate that 
they do not implement them. Certain policies were quantified in such a way that they could be 
sorted into discrete categories; the results are created or generated categorical variables. For 
example, in Medicaid benefits, types of services were initially measured in two variables: one 
indicating coverage and one indicating whether a copay is required. These two variables could be 
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combined into a single categorical variable, where a value of 0 would indicate that the service is 
not covered; a value of 1 would indicate that the service is covered, but a copay is required; and a 
value of 2 would indicate that the service is covered without a copay. Some continuous variables 
needed to be recoded if they measured items in such a way that a higher value would indicate 
less generosity (e.g., the month of pregnancy in which a woman with no other children first 
becomes eligible for TANF). These variables were recoded and inverted so that a higher value 
would always indicate more generosity.  
SNAP data were available from the FNS for each month of the year, so I collapsed all 12 
observations for a year into one observation, equal to the average of the monthly values. In cases 
where this collapse put a binary variable’s value between two integers, I usually broke it into an 
additional category in which these values, that indicated a policy was in place or eliminated for 
part of the year, took on their own unique integer value between the integers indicating whether a 
policy was in place. For variables with more than two categories in which the intermediate 
category indicated that the policy was only in part of the state, noninteger values signified that 
the policy was in place for part of the year either in the entire state or in the whole state. 
However, it is not immediately apparent from the data what type of change occurred (i.e., going 
from having a policy in part of the state to having it statewide, or going from having it in none of 
the state to having it in all of the state). In this case, all noninteger values were understood to 
indicate “partial coverage” in either the spatial or the temporal sense, or both. A full list of the 
variables generated using this process, along with a brief explanation of what the variable means 
and the values it can take on, are reported in Appendix 1. 
Ultimately, the database was created of the numerical codification of the rules that were 
relevant to states’ social safety net administration. However, limitations also existed, most 
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notably in identifying and choosing to include the relevant laws. The programs measured 
excluded Social Security and Medicare, neither of which demonstrate any real degree of 
devolution to states and whose provision remains centralized at the federal level. As examples of 
universal social insurance, Social Security and Medicare do not serve the same redistributive 
function as the programs included in the database; they also represent mandatory rather than 
discretionary federal spending. Therefore, they are unlikely to vary as dramatically because of 
the political or economic climate. Although these programs were excluded because they are 
universal (rather than means-tested), when they are combined they make up the bulk of the 
American assistance landscape, accounting for 45% of federal program expenditures in 2018 
(Social Security and Medicare Boards of Trustees, 2019). The exclusion of programs like Social 
Security, Medicare, and WIC means that scholars who might hope to look at the effects of those 
programs cannot properly do so using these data.  
Furthermore, coding decisions had to be made and sometimes-arbitrary cutoffs were 
imposed to create an ordinal scale for most variables. Although the decisions could have been 
made according to the data at hand, the choice of where to make a dividing line along the 
spectrum of different policies was always arbitrary to a degree. Although some rules lend 
themselves to simple binary (yes/no or 1/0) classifications, many more variables had to be 
constructed into an ordinal scale, and the choice of how to cluster the different rules along this 
scale had to be made by an individual and was not inherent to the data. Additionally, although 
quantitative data provide a rich panoply of research opportunities, a database such as this 
database did not lend itself to particularly nuanced examinations of individual programs or states. 
Although quantitative data are a valuable tool, they cannot substitute entirely for thoughtful 
qualitative studies.  
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Section 1.4 Social Determinants of Health 
Public health law in the United States addresses the legal powers necessary to ensure the 
health and welfare of populations as a function of good governance and rule of law ((Gostin & 
Wiley, 2016). With law creating the conditions for people to be healthy, public health law 
defines distributive justice in the distribution of resources for public health (Parmet, 2009). In 
understanding the role of law as a basis for health, public health law researchers examine “direct 
relationships between law and health, and relationships mediated through the effects of law on 
health behaviors and other processes and structures that affect population health” (Burris, 
Wagenaar, Swanson, Ibrahim, Wood, & Mello, 2010). Drawing on research on public health 
systems and services research, which studies “the organization, finance, and delivery of public 
health services,” public health law research has come to embrace empirically rigorous research 
methods from the social sciences to explore the causal effects and influences of law on public 
health systems, practices, and outcomes (Burris, Mays, Douglas Scutchfield, & Ibrahim, 2012; 
Mays, Halverson, & Scutchfield, 2003; Mello & Zeiler, 2008). 
Public health law researchers consider law as a determinant of public health and seek to 
test empirically the direct and indirect effects of law on public health outcomes (Burris, 2010). In 
such public health law, researchers seek to assess 
• the factors that affect whether laws are enacted (policymaking studies),  
• the content of the existing legal landscape (mapping studies), 
• the actual implementation and enforcement of the law (implementation studies),  
• the effects of the law on public health (intervention studies), and  
• the ways in which the laws affect health (mechanism studies). (Burris, Ashe, Levin, 
Penn, & Larkin, 2016).  
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According to Ramanathan, Hulkower, Holbrook, and Penn (2017), these intervention 
studies have come from the basis of the new field of “legal epidemiology” (p. __), scientifically 
studying “law as a factor in the cause, distribution, and prevention of disease and injury in a 
population” (p. 69). Examining the effects of the law on public health, such legal epidemiology 
is seen as necessary to provide empirical evidence that will help (a) to determine whether laws 
have the intended effects on public health and (b) to implement laws to improve public health 
(Burris et al., 2010).   
In approaching this inherently interdisciplinary research, researchers have employed a 
range of qualitative, quantitative, and mixed methods that have employed experimental, quasi-
experimental, observational, or participatory designs (Burris, Ashe, et al., 2016). Although 
researchers long employed qualitative methods to analyze the law’s impact on health outcomes, 
the recent trend has been toward quantification to assess the impact of public health law on 
health outcomes, thereby justifying public health law reforms (Burris, Ashe, et al., 2016). 
This “policy surveillance” has drawn on coding methodologies to measure the 
characteristics of public health laws (Burris, Hitchcock, Ibrahim, Penn, & Ramanathan, 2016). 
Analytic coding methodologies have taken root in public health law research, allowing for the 
systematic examination of the content of public health laws (Anderson, Tremper, Thomas, & 
Wagenaar, n.d.). Coding is a way to label and organize qualitative data (Green & Thorogood, 
2009). Especially where researchers are interested in analyzing a relatively abstract policy 
feature (e.g., “generosity”), these coding approaches help to identify in a deliberate manner the 
key ideas, themes, or core concepts that make up the variable of interest in a research question 
(Guest, MacQueen, & Namey, 2012). Coding approaches can also be applied to categorize more 
concrete policy concepts. For instance, clearly defined rules can be captured quantitatively in 
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binary or nominal/categorical variables that describe the presence or absence of certain policy 
features. Additionally, where policy exhibits rules that convey a clear order or varying degrees of 
intensity, these features can be converted to ordinal (or potentially even continuous) variables 
and used for analysis. 
Such coding allows for the systematic identification of characteristics of a law, providing 
a means to organize, correlate, and analyse themes across a set of laws (Burris et al., 2010). 
Beyond simply identifying the changes associated with the presence or absence of a law, coding 
facilitates the evaluation of the impact of specific and various dimensions of policy that often 
vary across jurisdictions (Pacula, Powell, Heaton, & Sevigny, 2015). Moreover, this approach to 
public health law research creates a platform to conduct statistical analysis and builds a valuable 
bridge between qualitative and quantitative (or econometric) methods of research.  
• Program evaluation – identifying the causal impact of a rule/policy/law change on an 
outcome. 
• Helps research move from simple associations to causation (see Burris et al., 2016,  
p. 14) 
• Can identify total and partial effects (depending on whether statistical models control 
for mediators). 
• Can identify differential effects across various groups (i.e., heterogeneous treatment 
effects between men vs women, between different age ranges, and between race 
groups). 
Such program evaluation has significance in informing legislative decisions on policy reforms, 
identifying intervention points according to the aspect of welfare eligibility rules that drive 
health outcomes and, thereby, overcoming components of the law that hinder public health 
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outcomes. As a basis for future research, such comparative coding of quantitative state data can 
guide research questions for more detailed qualitative studies at state-level. 
Section 1.5 Limitations and Future Applications 
Of course, the process of quantifying rules and regulations is not a simple one. 
Identifying the policies of interest poses difficulty and different research has been used to 
identify different methods of policy selection. Stacy et al. (2018), in creating the SNAP Policy 
Index for the USDA, focused on policies that have shown a statistically significant effect on the 
SNAP caseload. McKernan, Bernstein, and Fender (2005), in looking at TANF policies, 
emphasized the importance of identifying a typology prior to the quantification process; they 
advocated basing this on an outcome because “not all policies are hypothesized to affect all 
outcomes. Organizing policy typologies around outcomes thus reduces the complexity of welfare 
policies by limiting the number of policies in a typology” (p. 445). The strength of the database 
in this study is that it can be used to collect as much information on policies as is freely available 
from existing sources, with the opportunity to add additional policy information as it becomes 
available. Therefore, it is a relatively simple process to select the policies that might affect the 
outcome of interest for further analysis, either by aggregation into an index or other, more 
complex, processes such as factor analysis or cluster analysis.  
However, this study database is limited by the availability of information on these 
program regulations. Longitudinal quantitative analysis relies on repeated measures of the same 
indicators across time, yet a number of indicators contain no data before or after a certain period 
(e.g., the implementation of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) of ____ led to a number of changes 
in Medicaid indicators). Quantitative analysis also exploits variation, across either time or space, 
which is why I failed to include the WIC program; however, other types of analysis that do not 
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rely on this variation would benefit from the inclusion of such programs. The actual 
quantification procedure is also prey to the loss of information necessary in rendering nuanced 
information numerically. Not all policies lend themselves to clear bifurcation or division into 
categorical variables. Decisions about where to render cutoff points for division into ordinal 
variables were made according to an examination of the existing data, but they are inherently 
arbitrary. Additionally, by collapsing a variety of policy implementations into a single value, 
some information that was possibly of interest was necessarily lost.  
The database was generated with the aim of evaluating the effect of social assistance on 
birth outcomes, and the programs included were selected with that in mind; therefore, likely 
programs and policies of relevance to public health researchers were not included here (e.g., 
housing assistance). Furthermore, the programs selected represent only the federally funded (or 
mostly federally funded) safety net; however, states establish their own programs outside of this 
safety net. A comprehensive analysis of all social assistance would ideally include state-level 
assistance such as state EITCs. Nevertheless, the existing database as well as the methodology 
behind it will enable further research on the impact or effectiveness of welfare law on a number 
of public health outcomes, birth outcomes being only one example.  
Perhaps the biggest weakness of this database is a shortcoming inherent to quantitative 
policy research as a whole: the existence of a law or policy does not guarantee its uniform 
implementation as written. The social safety net generosity index is meant to measure the social 
assistance climate to which recipients are subject, but that climate depends on more than merely 
the policies themselves: it depends on how they are implemented. The experience of recipients in 
the United States depends on more than where one lives: it depends on with whom one interacts; 
therefore, the discretionary application of laws can change the way in which they affect the 
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public. Employees responsible for administering the safety net and implementing the policies 
written have a large amount of discretion in how they go about doing their jobs, and this 
discretion can mean the difference between being accepted to a program or being denied 
(Lipsky, 1971, 1980; Riccucci, 2005a, 2005b). These “street-level bureaucrats” have an equal 
impact on the experiences of those who rely on the safety net as the actual regulations; however, 
it is impossible to quantify this part of the experience. 
Although policy surveillance, analytic coding, and quantitative scales are indispensable to 
understanding the policy landscape of welfare generosity, quantitative methods cannot displace 
qualitative research—especially where binary indicators miss out on the specificity of policy 
variables. Instead, they can support other methods of analyzing public laws through larger 
datasets that can be analyzed across states and over time.  
Conclusion: Everyone Should Code 
Ultimately, social scientists in any field can make use of this methodology to examine the 
impact of changes in policy or related rules and regulations. The quantification of social safety 
net laws allows social and health policy researchers to assess the correlation of social welfare 
eligibility rules with health outcomes, providing evidence of policy impact. Statistical or 
econometric analysis can often bolster and complement existing qualitative research, or give 
credibility to anecdotal evidence. In an era of retrenchment and funding cuts for safety net 
programs, it is important to provide policymakers with evidence of the effectiveness of these 
programs not only on the recipient’s economic status, but also on the health of the total 
population. 
Going forward, using established methodologies for gathering such evidence will be 
crucial for policy scholars. Established methods for quantitative coding of state rules and 
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regulations are needed, and it is my hope that this database and its use in generating welfare 
generosity indicators can help to establish those methods. With this database I hope to begin 
bridging the gap that exists between the fields of public health and political or policy 
methodology. In making this data available to other researchers, I hope that social and health 
policy scholars interested in establishing the effectiveness of certain policies on public health 
outcomes can take advantage of this wealth of data as well as the sophisticated aggregation 





PAPER 2: CREATING A GENEROSITY SCALE: AGGREGATING SOCIAL SAFETY 
NET RULES 
Introduction 
The database of safety net policies created in Paper 1 can be used in a variety of different 
ways. In Paper 2, I use the data to construct two generosity measures. In Section 2.1, I examine 
the ways in which the resulting data can be merged into a single measure or score, quantifying 
social safety net generosity for each state in each year of the period by program, and allowing for 
comparative social policy analysis across states and over time. I discuss two procedures for 
aggregating the database into a single score, either by creating a generosity index, which 
measures the social assistance climate experienced by recipients, or a generosity scale, which 
measures the underlying or motivating generosity that causes changes to the policies.  
For the index, I simply took an average of all the indicators to create a measure of 
generosity in each state in a given year, while for the scale, I used statistical techniques and 
theoretical knowledge about the programs to develop a way of weighting the indicators from the 
database for a combination into a single measure. In Section 2.2, I demonstrate the construction 
of the social policy index, and in Section 2.3, I discuss the construction of the generosity scale 
using the database from Paper 1. In Section 2.4, I discuss the results of the index, and In Section 
2.5, I present the results of the factor analysis. In the final section, I discuss the implications of 
these results for future research, as well as their limitations, before concluding that the naïve 
index is currently the best aggregate measure for use in quantitative analysis.  
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Section 2.1 Aggregating the Data: Scale Versus Index 
The items included in the database are the rules and regulations that were made by the 
state regarding decisions such as eligibility thresholds for assistance or what services to offer 
low-income individuals, which are manifest variables in that they can be observed and measured. 
The next step was to aggregate these data into a single number that could be thought of as a 
crude measure of generosity in a state-year. Beyond using these directly observable variables to 
manifest a latent concept, the combination into a scale had the advantage of collapsing a large 
number of items into one score: the purpose of aggregating the data contained in this database 
was to create a single measure that would allow a comparison across time and space. Rather than 
include numerous measures that would be related to each welfare program in an analysis, this 
methodology allowed me to combine the data relating to program administration, benefit 
amounts, and eligibility requirements into a single measure for each state-year. Using the 
measure as a sole proxy for generosity allowed for the inherent benefits of parsimony (Harman, 
1976); furthermore, the manifold determinants of generosity, that vary slightly over time and 
across states, were absorbed in this scale. Any changes in rules, bureaucracy, benefit levels, or 
eligibility were reflected in the measure: changes could be seen as rendering a state-year more or 
less generous.  
With the generosity scale, I attempted to measure how generous a state was in a given 
year. Where “generosity” was the underlying concept, the rules governing the program 
administration and benefits were the observable items that I could use to illuminate it. The 
generosity of the social assistance climate was an unobserved, or latent, characteristic of a state-
year in that it could not be directly measured (Jöreskog & Sörbom, 1979 ). However, this 
generosity could be thought of in two different ways: as causing the policies, and as the result of 
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these policies. The difference was subtle, but important in that it affected the procedure of 
aggregating the data into a single measure.  
If generosity were to be thought of as the “temperature” of the state’s social assistance 
climate, it would be caused by changes in policies and rules surrounding assistance programs. 
Generosity in this sense is something to which aid recipients are subject, and it is a measure of 
their experience or environment. If generosity is truly a climate that is experienced by recipients 
and caseworkers, the best analogy for a measure of this latent variable is the heat index. 
According to the National Weather Service (n.d.), the heat index “is what the temperature feels 
like to the human body when relative humidity is combined with the air temperature.” The heat 
that one experiences is determined by the temperature and humidity, and both of these observed 
variables are combined into an index whose score is a more accurate assessment of the 
conditions experienced by individuals.  
In this analogy, the generosity index represents what is experienced by the recipients, and 
it is composed of measurable observed items, that is, the rules and regulations governing welfare 
programs. The variables contained in the assembled database are “cause indicators” in that their 
values determine the level of the latent construct rather than the other way around (DeVellis, 
2012). Changes in program rules and requirements represent the cause of a change in latent 
generosity. In this framework, the indicators or observed variables do not themselves need to 
share a common cause (e.g., variations in Medicaid coverage might be the result of different 
factors than variations in TANF services), However, they do result in a common effect, a change 
in the generosity experienced by recipients living in that state at that time. This framework also 
allowed indicators to change independently of each other, causing a change in generosity. If 
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work requirements were to become stricter, but Medicaid eligibility remained unchanged, the 
generosity value would still change along with the work requirement indicators.  
Figure 2.1  
 
Conceptual Model of Generosity Index 
 
To return to the weather analogy, the cause indicators can be thought of as the 
temperature in degrees or the humidity percentage; that is, they are observable and measurable 
facts about the environment, and it is these observations or measurements that are contained in 
the database. Generosity is analogous to the heat index in that these observations are combined 
into a single number and represents how someone subject to it experiences the environment. 
Much like the reason one feels hot on a given day is a result of the measured temperature in 
degrees as well as the humidity, how “generous” one’s state feels to an aid recipient is the result 
of TANF requirements, SNAP rules, and Medicaid restrictions.  
However, using a scale assumes that causality occurs in the opposite direction from an 
index. The presumption is that the latent generosity in a state directly causes the item values 
included in the scale; that is, program rules and administration vary because of this underlying 
generosity (Cohen, Cohen, Teresi, Marchi, & Velez, 1990; DeVellis, 2012). Items in a scale are 
more likely to correlate with each other, and they are certainly related in that they have a 










living in the environment, but rather it is an underlying mood or feeling in the state that affects 
how policymakers design program rules to allow for greater or lesser access to aid.  
Figure 2.2 
 
Conceptual Model of Generosity Scale 
 
Section 2.2 Construction of the Index 
The construction of an index in this case did not require any psychometric or probabilistic 
techniques to combine or reduce the data. What I have called a “naïve index” is simply a score 
between 0 and 1 in which a higher value indicates more generosity. To generate this index, each 
variable in the database was converted to a scale of 0–1. Binary variables were left in their 
current 0/1 format and categorical variables were recoded so that the highest value (i.e., most 
generous policy) would correspond to 1 and other values would fall in between. A variable with 
five categories that was previously coded as 0/1/2/3/4 became coded as 0/0.25/0.5/0.75/1. A 
continuous variable can be recoded in a similar way, being divided by its maximum possible 
value so that each value would represent a proportion of the greatest generosity possible for that 
item (where a higher value would indicate less generosity, these proportions were then subtracted 
from 1).  
In a few continuous variables, the maximum possible value for the indicator did not 










example, asset limits are more generous the higher they are. An asset limit represents the 
maximum value of a household’s assets before it are disqualified from assistance, for a large 
value of assets held by someone precludes the government from seeing them as in need of aid, 
even if that individual has low earnings. Assets include things such as the vehicles owned by the 
people in the household or money held in their savings accounts. States that allow higher asset 
limits are more generous because they allow more households to qualify; however, the state-year 
with the highest value asset limit does not represent the most generous policy because some 
states have chosen to eliminate the asset test. For variables such as this, each value was divided 
by the maximum possible value of that variable; the resulting value was then multiplied by 0.9. 
A value of 1 was reserved for the most generous policy possible, for example the elimination of 
the asset test. 
Although similar to what was done by the USDA to construct its own SNAP index, my 
process was slightly more complex than the USDA’s. Although the USDA’s SNAP Policy Index 
was created simply by adding or subtracting a unit for each policy adopted in a state-year 
according to whether it accommodated or encouraged SNAP participation, the USDA’s index 
contained only binary indicators (Stacy et al., 2018). My data contains categorical variables with 
more than two categories as well as a number of continuous measures; therefore, I converted 
everything to fall between (0) and (1).  
Once every variable in the database takes on a value from 0–1, they could be aggregated 
in any number of combinations to form an index of generosity by simply taking an average of the 
chosen variables in each state-year. A naïve index can be constructed using all the variables and 
measuring the climate for all assistance; similarly, it can be created for each individual program 
to take the temperature of the Medicaid climate or the TANF climate. Programs can be further 
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broken down, with indices measuring particular program aspects (e.g., eligibility criteria or 
administrative exclusion). Although the naïve index simply uses an average of the 0/1 scores, it 
is possible to subject these variable scores to different weighting schemes. Depending on what is 
to be measured, one can use their substantive knowledge of the policy landscape to develop 
deterministically these weights. For example, to look at how generosity affects immigrants’ 
health or experiences, one might weight immigrant eligibility criteria more heavily.  
The naïve index contains a total generosity score as well as three program scores; these 
program indices in turn were generated by averaging their subindices. Each program contains 
different subindices. The SNAP index contains the fewest subindices (at only two); it is 
composed of a measure of eligibility and a measure of administrative burden or administrative 
cost. The Medicaid program index is a combination of four subindices: administrative burden, 
benefit generosity, eligibility, and rules for immigrants. The TANF program index contains four 
subindices: applicant processes, behavioral conditions, benefit receipt, benefit limits, and work 
requirements.  
Section 2.3 Constructing a Scale 
Unlike the index, scale construction uses theory to drive the process. In deciding on the 
next steps in the construction of the social safety net generosity scale, exploratory factor analysis 
(which uses statistical methods to create latent variables or classes that exist because of 
correlations in the data) was rejected in favor of confirmatory factor analysis (which specifies in 
advance a pathway through which the latent and manifest variables are related; Bollen, 2014). To 
create this scale, knowledge of the American social and health policy landscapes, as well as 
existing theories in political science and public administration, were used to hypothesize the 
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relationship between generosity and the items measured, notably through intermediate latent 
variables.  
The key distinction between the two different methodologies is that exploratory factor 
analysis is used to search the data for underlying patterns without a theoretical justification; all of 
the observed and unobserved variables are allowed to correlate with one another and the number 
of latent variables is not specified in advance. However, confirmatory factor analysis begins with 
“a detailed and identified initial model” (Bollen, 2014, p. 28). 
Three models are proposed as possible ways in which generosity and program policies 
are related. Each model contains different intermediate latent variables that are all related to 
generosity, but that do not all relate to every item measured. Instead, observed items were 
divided into different categories, each of which relates to generosity through a different 
intermediate latent variable. The three possible models follow:  
• Program model: This model hypothesizes that generosity affects each program 
differently. Consequently, the observed variables are divided into three groups that 
correspond to three intermediate latent variables, each one representing a different 
assistance program. 
• Coverage model: This model focuses on the possible tradeoff between the number of 
people covered (breadth) and how generous the benefits provided to those people are 
(depth). The intermediate latent variables are breadth and depth and the observed 
variables are assigned to one or the other category (or possibly both, for some items) 
depending on whether a more generous response to that item implies that the benefit 




• Administrative model: This model distinguishes between observed items that 
represent benefit levels and those that represent administrative hurdles for recipients 
and social services employees. Items representing bureaucratic red tape or 
administrative hassle represent generosity in that increased hassle discourages 
program participation through administrative exclusion. (Brodkin & Majmundar, 
2010) 
The variables that were included in the factor analysis were rescaled so that all of the 
categorical variables took on integer values only. A variable that might initially have taken on 
the values 1, 1.5 or 2 was recoded to take on the values 1, 2 or 3 to avoid problems when running 
the models in MPLUS. 
Following is a description of the steps undertaken to construct the Program Model of 
Generosity. A similar process, in which variables were added a few at a time to create 
intermediate latent variables before those intermediate variables were combined into the 
hierarchical models illustrated in Figures 2.3–2.5, was undertaken for each of the three 
hypothesized models. For the sake of brevity, full descriptions of model construction for all three 
models, as well as for all intermediate latent variables, are not included here because the steps 
undertaken were similar to those described in the following paragraphs.  
Program Model Construction 
Construction of the program model began by assembling a model for SNAP. The 
continuous latent variable that was meant to embody the concept of generosity within the food 
stamp program was analyzed with 14 indicators from the SNAP program. Upon first running a 
CFA of just the SNAP generosity latent variable by all 14 indicators, I determined that FS11 (or 
a variable measuring whether a state requires finger-printing of applicants) was negatively 
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correlated with a number of other indicators. The variables were coded such that a higher value 
would indicate a more generous policy; therefore, all of the variables should be positively 
correlated.  
It is unclear why finger-printing would be inversely correlated with every other indicator 
of generosity within the food stamp program, but upon closer examination of the data, finger-
printing appears to have only ever required in five states: Arizona, California, Massachusetts, 
New York, and Texas. This correlation was negative; therefore, the requirement of finger-prints 
does not seem to be an especially effective indicator of any underlying generosity in the SNAP 
program, which was what the latent variable was intended to measure. Therefore, it was 
excluded from the analysis. 
After inputting the SNAP variables into MPLUS, it was necessary to check that the factor 
loadings indicated statistical significance within the model (p <= 0.5; for all SNAP indicators the 
factor loadings had p values of 0.000). Then the R2 estimates were checked for significance as 
well; once again, for all included indicators, the two-tailed p value was approximately 0.000. The 
model fit was then improved by allowing the measurement errors of certain variables to correlate 
with one another. FS04 and FS05 are both variables that indicate whether a face-to-face 
interview is required for certification. FS04 indicates whether this is a requirement for initial 
certification and FS05 indicates the requirement for recertification. It makes sense that these data 
are gathered from the same place; therefore, if any measurement error exists in one place, a 
similar degree of measurement error will likely exist in the other place.  
Other measurement errors were allowed to correlate with one another, although there is a 
less obvious reason for their indicators to suffer from similar types of measurement error. These 
variable pairs indicate (a) whether a state used a simplified reporting option for households with 
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earnings in a particular year (FS06), (b) which vehicles, if any, or up to what value of a vehicle 
would be exempted from counting toward a household’s asset limit (FS07), (c) whether a state 
operated a combine application program (CAP) for Supplemental Security Income (SSI) 
recipients to apply for SNAP (FS02), and (d) the average length of the certification period in a 
state (FS09). Standardized results for this intermediate model can be found in Table 2.6. Figure 
2.25 is a diagram that indicates the structure of these results.   
The next step in constructing the program model was to repeat the process that had 
already been undertaken on the SNAP program to generate the intermediate latent variables 
TANF and Medicaid. The results of these single latent variable models indicated a somewhat 
poor fit, particularly for the Medicaid variable; therefore, a combination of the three programs 
into the hierarchical model proposed in Figure 2.3 was not carried out.  
Additional Model Construction 
The indicators chosen for inclusion in the intermediate latent variables shown in Figures 
2.4–5 are indicated Table 2.1.  
Table 2.1 
 
Factor Analysis Variables 
Variable Definition Coverage model Admin model 
FS01 Does SNAP use BBCE? Breadth Admin 
FS02 Does SNAP streamline the application process for SSI recipients? Breadth Admin 
FS03 What percentage of SNAP benefits use EBT cards? Depth Admin 
FS04 Does the state allow a telephone interview instead of face-to-face for initial SNAP certification? Depth Admin 
FS05 Does the state allow a telephone interview for SNAP recertification? Depth Admin 
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Variable Definition Coverage model Admin model 
FS06 Does the state allow a simplified reporting option for household income for SNAP? Depth Admin 
FS07 Are the value of vehicles excluded from the SNAP asset test? Breadth 
Benefits/ 
eligibility 
FS08 To what extent does SNAP cover noncitizens? Breadth Benefits/ eligibility 
FS09 What is the length of the average period for which a SNAP household is certified eligible? Depth Admin 
FS10 Does the state operate SNAP call centers? Depth Admin 
FS11 Does the state require fingerprinting of SNAP recipients? Depth Admin 
FS12 Is there an online SNAP application? Depth Admin 
FS13 Does the state do any SNAP outreach? Depth Admin 
FS14 Does the state offer transitional SNAP benefits? Depth Benefits/ eligibility 
TANF2PAR Are two-parent households eligible for TANF assistance? Breadth Benefits/ eligibility 
TANFA1 What is the asset limit for TANF applicants? Breadth Benefits/ eligibility 
TANFA2 Is the TANF applicant asset limit higher for households that contain an elderly or disabled member? Breadth Admin 
TANFA4 What is the asset limit for TANF recipients? Breadth Benefits/ eligibility 
TANFA5 Is the TANF recipient asset limit higher for households that contain and elderly or disabled member? Breadth Admin 
TANFBN6 What is the maximum monthly TANF benefit for a family of three? Depth 
Benefits/ 
eligibility 
TANFBV0 How many behavioral conditions are imposed upon TANF recipients? Depth Admin 





Variable Definition Coverage model Admin model 
TANFD6 Does receipt of a diversion payment count towards the TANF lifetime time limit? Depth 
Benefits/ 
eligibility 
TANFD9 What form do TANF diversion payments take? Depth Benefits/ eligibility 
TANFF1 Does the state impose a cap on family size for TANF benefits? Depth 
Benefits/ 
eligibility 
TANFIM0 Does the state provide TANF coverage to immigrants beyond that which is covered by PRWORA? Breadth 
Benefits/ 
eligibility 
TANFINC1 What is the income limit for TANF applicants? Breadth Benefits/ eligibility 
TANFJS Is a job search required upon application for TANF? Depth Admin 
TANFL1 How long is the lifetime limit for receipt of TANF assistance? Depth Admin 
TANFL2 When the TANF lifetime limit is reached, whose benefits are terminated? Depth 
Benefits/ 
eligibility 
TANFL3 Does the state impose spell limits on TANF assistance? Depth Admin 
TANFPREG In which trimester of pregnancy is a woman with no other children eligible for TANF? Breadth 
Benefits/ 
eligibility 
TANFSC3 What is the most severe sanction that exists for noncompliance with TANF conditions? Depth 
Benefits/ 
eligibility 
TANFTEEN Can minor parents be considered the head of TANF households? Breadth 
Benefits/ 
eligibility 
TANFWR1 When must work participation begin for TANF applicants? Depth Admin 
TANFWX0 How many exemptions exist to TANF work requirements? Depth Admin 
MCAD01 How long is the wait length for Medicaid enrollment? Depth Admin 
MCAD02 Has the state eliminated face-to-face interviews for Medicaid for SSI recipients? Depth Admin 
MCAD03 Has the state eliminated face-to-face interviews for Medicaid for parents? Depth Admin 
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Variable Definition Coverage model Admin model 
MCAD04 Has the state eliminated the Medicaid asset test for all recipients? Breadth Admin 
MCAD05 Has the state eliminated the Medicaid asset test for parents? Breadth Admin 
MCAD06 Does the state presume Medicaid eligibility for SSI recipients? Depth Admin 
MCAD07 Does the state presume Medicaid eligibility for pregnant women? Depth Admin 
MCAD08 Does the state have continuous eligibility for Medicaid? Depth Admin 
MCAD09 Has the state eliminated face-to-face interviews for Medicaid renewal for all recipients? Depth Admin 
MCAD10 Has the state eliminated face-to-face interviews for Medicaid renewal for parents? Depth Admin 
MCAD11 How frequently must all Medicaid recipients renew their eligibility? Depth Admin 
MCAD12 How frequently must parents renew their Medicaid eligibility? Depth Admin 
MCBOPAV To what degree does a state cover optional Medicaid services? Depth 
Benefits/ 
eligibility 
MCEL01 What is the Medicaid income limit for children less than one year of age? Breadth 
Benefits/ 
eligibility 
MCEL02 What is the Medicaid income limit for children between one and five years of age? Breadth 
Benefits/ 
eligibility 
MCEL03 What is the Medicaid income limit for children between six and eighteen years of age? Breadth 
Benefits/ 
eligibility 
MCEL04 What is the Medicaid income limit for pregnant women? Breadth Benefits/ eligibility 
MCEL05 What is the Medicaid income limit for parents? Breadth Benefits/ eligibility 





Variable Definition Coverage model Admin model 
MCIM99 To what extent does Medicaid cover noncitizens? Breadth Benefits/ eligibility 
MCMANDCO How many mandatory Medicaid services require a copay? Depth Benefits/ eligibility 
MCRX Do prescription drugs require a copay? Depth Benefits/ eligibility 
Note. BBCE = broad-based categorical eligibility; EBT = electronic benefits transfer; FS = Food Stamps; MC = 
Medicaid; PRWORA = Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act; SNAP = Supplemental 
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Section 2.4 Results of the Index 
The initial indices are unweighted. An average was generated for the SNAP program, 
another average for TANF, and another average for Medicaid. The three program indices were 
averaged together into the total social safety net generosity index. Although the total generosity 
score was a composite of all three program scores, the absolute values of these four indices could 
not be compared to one another. For example, the TANF generosity index was consistently lower 
in value than the other three indices; however, this did not automatically mean that TANF 
policies are less generous than SNAP or Medicaid policies. Instead, each index’s scores are 
comparable only to its other values in different states or years. Tables and graphs of these index 
scores across states and years are available throughout this paper and in the appendix.  
Key Result 1: States Are Getting More Generous Over Time 
Averaged over all 50 states and the District of Columbia, total generosity increased from 
2004 to 2016; however, it did not increase monotonically (see Figure 2.6). This was true of the 
SNAP and TANF generosity indices as well; however, Medicaid generosity, with the exception 
of an extremely tiny decrease from 2011 to 2012, actually did increase each year.  
Looking at the results of the naïve index shows largely what one expects to see: over 
time, generosity is mostly increasing. Although it might have increased because of the increased 
dollar values of benefit award amounts, benefit limits, and means-tests as the years progress, 
which might lead states to score within a higher category for certain variables (e.g., applicant 
asset limits), the vast majority of indicators making up the index concern policies and 
procedures, rather than with actual amounts. Within the three program indices, subindices 
measuring TANF behavioral conditions or the Medicaid eligibility for different categories of 
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immigrants are increasing on average from 2004–2016, despite containing no measures of dollar 
amounts. 
The top 10% of all state-year observations on each program index and the total generosity 
index contain observations from every year after 2004, and the top 10% of TANF and Medicaid 
observations also contain some from 2004, which does not support the idea that generosity grows 
over time (see Figures 2.9–2.16). However, the bottom 10% of all observations on the four 
indices are rather different and do seem to indicate generosity growth over time. Only Medicaid 
and TANF have observations in the bottom 10% that occur after 2011, although for Medicaid, 
those observations in 2014–2016 are only from Mississippi, which has the lowest Medicaid 
generosity score in ever year (see Figure 2.16). In fact, the 10 lowest Medicaid generosity scores 
across all state-year observations are all from Mississippi from 2004–2013. Only in 2014, does 
Mississippi’s Medicaid generosity finally exceed Alabama’s Medicaid generosity score in 2004. 
The bottom 10% of all state-year observations occur from 2004–2010. This indicates that the 
generosity growth observed over time is occurring mostly at the lower end of the generosity 
spectrum.  
Only one state, Kansas, ended the period examined with a lower total generosity score in 
2016 than in 2004 (approximately 0.36% lower). Although Kansas began ranked 30th in total 
generosity, it fell to last place, 51st, by 2016. It was also the only state of all 51 states to end with 
a SNAP generosity score lower than when it began. Fifteen states end with TANF generosity 
scores lower in 2016 than in 2004, while only four states end with Medicaid scores lower than 
that with which they began. Most states that have negative percentage changes on any of the 
three program indices show rather small decreases, less than 10%. However, the TANF index 
has three outliers: North Dakota’s TANF score decreases by 25.82%, Rhode Island’s by 17.12% 
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and Tennessee’s by 11.33%. Although all three of these states began ranked in the top 10 in 
TANF generosity (4th, 9th, and 8th respectively), they fall in the rankings as their scores 
decreased (to 30th, 33rd and 23rd).  
Key Result 2: SNAP Differs in Fundamental Ways From the Other Two Programs 
The SNAP index demonstrated a different trend over this period. It showed small but 
consistent growth from 2004 until a jump from 2008 to 2009; this growth then continued until its 
peak in 2014, after which it decreased slightly in 2015. The growth curve observed on the SNAP 
index between 2008 and approximately 2014 is much more dramatic than the more level growth 
shown by Medicaid and TANF. This leads the second major takeaway from the index results: 
that SNAP is fundamentally different in some way. 
The average percentage change in SNAP generosity between 2008 and 2009 is about 
15%, and from 2009 to 2010, it is about 10%, which are much larger than the usual average 
percentage changes from year to year along other program indices. In addition, TANF shows a 
large (10%) average percentage change from 2008 to 2009; however, the maximum percentage 
change that year for any state in TANF generosity is just under 20%, while the maximum change 
observed in a state along the SNAP index is 60.5%. The time frame for this generosity increase 
is noteworthy, for it coincides with the Great Recession and large increases in the number of 
Americans eligible for and applying for SNAP benefits; TANF, by contrast, did not show a 
similar growth in caseload, likely because of its block grant structure (Rosenbaum, 2013; Slack 
& Myers, 2014). The federal government pays for 100% of SNAP benefit costs, meaning that 
states are only responsible for paying about half of the cost of administering the program 
(FitzGerald, Holcombe, Dahl, & Schwabish, 2012). However, TANF and Medicaid require 
increased state funding when benefits or eligibility are expanded. 
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SNAP generosity also shows the most volatility, with percentage change from one year to 
the next for each state peaking at over 72% for Utah from 2006 to 2007. However, the SNAP 
index is made up of the fewest indicators, which means that a change in fewer SNAP policies 
generates much more variation than a change in the same number of policies for TANF or 
Medicaid. The TANF index is made up of many more indicators; therefore, the large changes in 
TANF generosity observed from 2008 to 2009 and from 2014 to 2015 beg further scrutiny. 
When looking at the TANF subindices (Figure 2.7), one can see that the large change in 2009 
occurs almost entirely because of an increase in the generosity of behavioral conditions, while 
the change in 2015 occurs because of a change in benefit limits, although the latter growth is 
attenuated by a rather sharp decrease the following year. The underlying trends in SNAP 
applications across the country as the economy reached its nadir might also be responsible for 
the states’ loosening of the rules: when applications surge, so too does the burden placed on the 
existing program infrastructure. States might well respond to this increased demand by 
simplifying processes for applying and receiving benefits. 
An examination of the five most generous and the five least generous states for each 
index in each year shows some interesting results. Only 10 states never appear as one of the five 
most or least generous states in any of the four indices: Arizona, Hawaii, Iowa, Nevada, North 
Carolina, Ohio, Rhode Island, Vermont, Virginia and West Virginia (see Figures 2.8–2.11). No 
state that appears within the five most generous states of a particular index in one year also 
appears among the five least generous for that same program index in another year. This result 
also means that no state sees a large enough increase or decrease in generosity on any one 
program to go from being part of the least generous to part of the most generous, or to drop from 
among the most generous to among the least generous. This result holds true for total generosity 
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as well. However, some states do appear among the most generous states on one program index 
while also appearing among the least generous on another program index, possibly indicating a 
substitution of one type of support for another.  
Florida, Kentucky, Nebraska, North Dakota, Michigan, New Jersey, South Carolina, and 
Wisconsin all appear among the five most generous states in at least 1 year on one program 
index while also appearing among the five least generous states in at least 1 year on another 
program index. With the exception of North Dakota, which is among the most generous on the 
TANF index and the least generous on the Medicaid index, one of the indices on which these 
states all appear among the least or most generous is the SNAP index. This indicates that SNAP 
generosity might differ from that of the other two programs in some fundamental way. Florida, 
Kentucky, Michigan, South Carolina, and Wisconsin all appear among the most generous states 
on the SNAP index at some point, while appearing among the least generous on the TANF or 
Medicaid indices.  
Considering the way that these programs are funded, it is possible that states will 
substitute towards SNAP generosity when becoming less generous along other programs. 
Although the options available to states are lesser for modifying SNAP generosity, states do have 
some flexibility that would allow them to offset contractions in TANF or Medicaid generosity 
with some increases in SNAP generosity. Some evidence of this flexibility exists in the data: 
when looking at percentage changes from the prior year (for each program index by state), the 
correlation of those SNAP percentage changes with Medicaid and with TANF are negative in 
Florida, Kentucky, and South Carolina. This result means that states that show large or numerous 
increases on one of these program indices also tend to show large or numerous decreases on the 
other program index.   
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However, examining the correlations between the percentage changes by state and 
correlation between the program indices by state does not necessarily confirm this hypothesis. 
When looking at percentage changes, SNAP and Medicaid have negatively correlated percentage 
changes in 26 states, SNAP and TANF have negatively correlated percentage changes in 20 
states, and Medicaid and TANF have negatively correlated percentage changes in 22 states. 
When looking at the program indices themselves, SNAP and Medicaid are negatively correlated 
in 10 states, SNAP and TANF are negatively correlated in nine states, and Medicaid and TANF 
are negatively correlated in 13 states.  
Key Result 3: A State Can Become More Generous Relative to Itself Over Time While 
Simultaneously Becoming Less Generous Relative to Other States 
Maine began among the most generous states, ranking 3rd in total generosity in 2004 and 
4th in 2005 and 2006. In 2007, it fell out of the top five, to 6th, and began to fall steadily. Yet, 
even as Maine fell in the generosity rankings, for its generosity score was trending mostly 
upwards (see Figure 2.12). This implies that, even while Maine’s generosity score is usually 
increasing, its drop in the rankings of state generosity is driven less by its decisions to make its 
own policies less generous than by other states’ decisions to make their policies much more 
generous. Until 2015, Maine’s generosity score was usually growing, but it was growing at a 
much lesser rate than other states. From 2015 to 2016, Maine only fell from 23rd in generosity to 
28th; this meant that from 2004 through 2015, Maine fell from 3rd in generosity to 23rd, even as 
its generosity increased. In fact, Maine’s largest drop in the generosity rankings came between 
2008 and 2009, when it fell from 8th to 14th even while its score grew from 0.563 to 0.575. 
Maine, Missouri, North Dakota and South Carolina all fell more than 20 positions in the ranking 
of states by total generosity, even while their own generosity scores increased; North Dakota fell 
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from 12th to 44th in generosity while its score increased by 1.6%. Missouri fell from 22nd to 
46th with a score increase of 8.8% and South Carolina fell from 13th to 34th with a score 
increase of 13.96%.  
Key Result 4: More Generous States Tend to Be in the Northeast and Along the West 
Coast, While Less Generous States Tend to Be in the South and the (Noncoastal) West 
Geographically, the index mostly adheres to expectations. The most generous states tend 
to be those located in the Northeast and on the West Coast. Southern and “Western” states tend 
to be less generous, with a number of Midwestern states falling in the middle. Although this is 
the general trend, there are outliers, especially when looking at the individual program indices. 
Once again, SNAP seems to show some counter-intuitive results (see Figures 2.15–2.16). 
Florida, Kentucky, Louisiana, and South Carolina all have observations on the SNAP index that 
are among the most generous 10%. However, New Hampshire and New Jersey have 
observations that fall within the least generous 10% of SNAP observations.   
Only 20 states ever appear among the five most or least generous states in a given year 
for only one of the three program indices; however, 11 of those states also appear among the 
least or most generous states in the total generosity index. These 11 states are evenly divided on 
which program they scored very high or low, meaning that high or low generosity in the total 
generosity index is not necessarily driven by a single program more than others.  
Three states scored either very high or very low on all four indices. These states are 
Georgia, which was among the least generous states in at least 1 year for all four indices, and 
California and New York, which were both among the most generous. New York was among the 
five most generous states on total generosity in every year examined, while California was 
similarly generous, although it was not among the five most generous in 2005 and 2006, when it 
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fell to 6th place in total generosity. Georgia, although one of the less generous states, was only 
among the five least generous states on total generosity in the first 2 years examined, 2004 and 
2005. On the SNAP index, neither California nor New York was among the most generous in all 
years. Both started out on the lower end of SNAP generosity; however, New York jumped from 
28th to 4th in SNAP generosity from 2007–2008. California also started out scoring relatively 
low on the SNAP index (30th in 2004), before beginning to rise in 2011, finally cracking the top 





Index Averages Over Time  
 







TANF Subindices Over Time 
 
Note. TANF = Temporary Assistance for Needy Families.  
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States Appearing Among the Five Most or Least Generous in Any Year, Total Generosity  
 







































States Appearing Among the Five Most or Least Generous in Any Year, SNAP Generosity  
 









































States Appearing Among the Five Most or Least Generous in Any Year, TANF Generosity  
 
















































States Appearing Among the Five Most or Least Generous in Any Year, Medicaid Generosity  
 


































Total Generosity Score and Ranking (ME, MO, ND, SC) 2004–2016  
 
Note. ME = Maine, MO = Missouri, ND = North Dakota, SC = South Carolina.  
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Most Generous States in Each Year, 2004–2016  
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Least Generous States in Each Year, 2004–2016  
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Most Generous (SNAP) States in Each Year, 2004–2016  
 
Note. SNAP = Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program.  
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Least Generous (SNAP) States in Each Year, 2004–2016, SNAP Generosity  
 
Note. SNAP = Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program.  
      	 		 	 	












































Most Generous (TANF) States in Each Year, 2004–2016 
 
Note. TANF = Temporary Assistance to Needy Families.  
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Least Generous (TANF) States in Each Year, 2004–2016, TANF Generosity  
 
Note. TANF = Temporary Assistance to Needy Families.  
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Most Generous (Medicaid) States in Each Year, 2004–2016 
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Least Generous (Medicaid) States in Each Year, 2004–2016 
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Figure 2.21  
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Georgia Generosity Scores, 2004–2016  
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Temperature Map, Average Total Generosity  
 







Summary Statistics of Naïve Generosity Indices 
Index Mean Minimum Maximum Standard deviation 
Total generosity .5317172 .3471608 .7503504 .0866135 
SNAP .6259458 .22674 .9276161 .1629048 
TANF .4001061 .2368881 .6392358 .0840427 
Medicaid .5690997 .312247 .8412649 .1087563 




Naïve Index Scores by State (2004–2016 average) 
State Generosity SNAP TANF Medicaid 
Alabama .4825094 .5964706 .4227667 .428291 
Alaska .4321277 .3996552 .4176299 .479098 
Arizona .525705 .6667449 .3786946 .5316756 
Arkansas .4287793 .4520999 .2819412 .5522969 
California .6481161 .649694 .5840579 .7105964 
Colorado .5702886 .6024168 .5222792 .5861699 
Connecticut .5442247 .6417972 .3200706 .6708062 
Delaware .5801009 .7481987 .3646922 .6274119 
District of Columbia .6220891 .6291338 .4372067 .7999267 
Florida .4781615 .6674421 .2924904 .4745519 
Georgia .4649217 .6499934 .3106179 .4341538 
Hawaii .5315687 .5624731 .414274 .617959 
Idaho .4408858 .5262875 .2612257 .5351442 
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State Generosity SNAP TANF Medicaid 
Illinois .6200768 .6209809 .5070261 .7322234 
Indiana .4819937 .5482592 .3530292 .5446929 
Iowa .5227466 .5961144 .3958146 .5763108 
Kansas .4471332 .5342657 .314449 .4926847 
Kentucky .4832326 .6406651 .3828138 .4262191 
Louisiana .5383711 .6554154 .3744674 .5852305 
Maine .5736161 .7260614 .3899548 .6048322 
Maryland .608059 .7632583 .4588147 .6021039 
Massachusetts .6535289 .7970371 .386859 .7766907 
Michigan .5423533 .713634 .3283918 .5850341 
Minnesota .5264687 .5726395 .3191628 .6876038 
Mississippi .4537161 .6314456 .3847772 .3449256 
Missouri .4725177 .4991187 .3845688 .5338656 
Montana .4642417 .5971961 .2814395 .5140896 
Nebraska .5492888 .490965 .5588428 .5980586 
Nevada .5371904 .6118947 .462956 .5367205 
New Hampshire .528896 .5889559 .4369789 .5607532 
New Jersey .5841934 .6243391 .3674979 .7607434 
New Mexico .5690533 .6330532 .4839889 .5901179 
New York .6833334 .7066482 .5554954 .7878567 
North Carolina .4918579 .61201 .3294165 .5341472 
North Dakota .5093243 .6303724 .4487901 .4488103 
Ohio  .5800412 .6808324 .4988356 .5604556 
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State Generosity SNAP TANF Medicaid 
Oklahoma .484074 .5921395 .354208 .5058745 
Oregon .5958489 .7088526 .5503352 .5283589 
Pennsylvania .5532521 .7184998 .3587061 .5825504 
Rhode Island .5606193 .6144291 .4110644 .6563645 
South Carolina .5311154 .7855365 .3633202 .4444895 
South Dakota .4159727 .4366546 .3483497 .4629137 
Tennessee .5068779 .589543 .4043062 .5267846 
Texas .5622937 .7048871 .4449366 .5370574 
Utah .4577748 .5289548 .3453239 .4990458 
Vermont .5347096 .6244636 .3933252 .5863401 
Virginia .5217873 .615029 .4803023 .4700305 
Washington .6823975 .881237 .4200994 .7351725 
West Virginia .5455916 .7092323 .3926808 .5348615 
Wisconsin .5607974 .7747017 .2903419 .6173487 
Wyoming .4337517 .3608243 .4357915 .5046391 
Note. SNAP = Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program; TANF = Temporary Assistance to Needy Families. All 
mentions of Washington in these tables refer to Washington state; the city of Washington, D.C. is referred to as 
District of Columbia. 
Table 2.4 
 
Naïve Index Scores by Year (average across 50 states and the District of Columbia) 
Year Generosity SNAP TANF Medicaid 
2004 .4537721 .4488554 .3832398 .5292211 
2005 .4617495 .470624 .3807759 .5338484 
2006 .469468 .4915386   .3787168 .5381487 
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2007 .4794824 .5210689 .3709164 .5464618 
2008 .4896614 .5464439 .3704329 .5521075 
2009 .5304693 .6191471 .4069943 .5652663 
2010 .5533397 .6767495 .4132604 .5700093 
2011 .5669731 .7143335 .4150384 .5715475 
2012 .5703178 .7304043 .4095912 .5709579 
2013 .5795226 .7388238 .4127933 .5869507 
2014 .5809754 .7392619 .4068059 .5968583 
2015 .587878 .7197828 .430064 .6137872 
2016 .5887142 .7202622 .4227495 .6231309 





Naïve Index Leaders   
Type of generosity Ranking States 
Total generosity Top five states New York, Washington, Massachusetts, California, District 
of Columbia 
 Bottom five states South Dakota, Arkansas, Alaska, Wyoming, Idaho 
 Largest % change from 
2004–2016 
Iowa, Oklahoma, Florida, Minnesota, North Carolina 
SNAP generosity Top five states Washington, Massachusetts, South Carolina, Wisconsin, 
Maryland 
 Bottom five states Wyoming, Alaska, South Dakota, Arkansas, Nebraska 
 Largest % change from 
2004–2016 
Minnesota, Florida, New Jersey, Rhode Island, Georgia 
TANF generosity Top five states California, Nebraska, New York, Oregon, Colorado 
 Bottom five states Idaho, Montana, Arkansas, Wisconsin, Florida 
 Largest % change from 
2004–2016 
Oklahoma, Wyoming, District of Columbia, Delaware, 
Nebraska 
Medicaid generosity Top five states District of Columbia, New York, Massachusetts, New Jersey, 
Washington 
 Bottom five states Mississippi, Kentucky, Alabama, Georgia, South Carolina 
 Largest % change from 
2004–2016 
Texas, Tennessee, Oregon, West Virginia, Ohio 
Note. SNAP = Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program; TANF = Temporary Assistance to Needy Families. 
Section 2.5 Scale Results 
The results of the individual program models would indicate that there is not some 
underlying factor inherent to the program that drives the generosity of that program’s indicators 
for both TANF and Medicaid; however, SNAP does show some degree of an underlying latent 
generosity. This echoes the results of the naïve index, where the SNAP program index differed 
from the other two program indices in its pattern of growth as well as in which states could be 
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considered leaders and laggards in SNAP generosity. The variables included in the SNAP index 
(see Table 2.6) are also all positively correlated with underlying SNAP generosity, which 
indicates that all the indicators move in tandem with the latent construct; there is no tradeoff in 
generosity within the SNAP indicators.  
The TANF program analysis (see Table 2.7) seems to indicate that a latent TANF 
generosity does not exist in the same way. Only nine out of more than 20 variables remained 
significant indicators of this generosity. Two of those nine indicators—those measuring coverage 
of immigrants and behavioral conditions placed on recipients—are negatively related to TANF 
generosity, indicating possible tradeoffs in different areas of the program. Looking at the R2 
values also seems to indicate that the real generosity being measured stems from the diversion 
program as well as time limits on receipt.  
TANF diversions are a way in which states attempt to reduce the numbers on their 
welfare rolls. By providing a one-time payment to households experiencing a short-term crisis, 
states hope to keep that household from having to receive traditional TANF assistance in the 
future (London, 2003; Ridzi & London, 2006). The time limits refer to both lifetime limits as 
well as intermittent or spell limits. The other variables that remain significant enough for 
inclusion in the model have small coefficients as well as small R2 values. This would seem to 
indicate that there is something about diversion and time limits—both of which serve to keep the 
number of households on the welfare rolls smaller—that change together. 
The Medicaid single program analysis (see Table 2.8) also has indicators that are 
negatively related to the latent Medicaid generosity. These are indicators that address copays for 
services covered in every state. The most significant indicators of Medicaid generosity seem to 
be those that address eligibility, both related to income as well as to immigration status. 
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However, model fit statistics indicate that the model overall is not a good fit, showing that latent 
Medicaid generosity (as a construct) does not exist according to all the available indicators. 
When one looks at the results of the intermediate latent variables for the coverage model 
by breadth versus depth, one can see that these two latent constructs cannot accurately account 
for the variation in generosity. The breadth construct went from 24 indicators to 15, however the 
model was a poor fit (see Table 2.9). Nevertheless, although not perfectly explaining underlying 
breadth of coverage, the indicators with the largest factor loadings and R2 values were in fact the 
variables that indicated which persons would be eligible for coverage. The finding is noteworthy 
that, although Medicaid coverage indicators about the asset and income limits of applicants 
remained significant, the asset tests and income limits of TANF applicants and recipients either 
were excluded from the model or had very little explanatory power. Although the means tests for 
SNAP are federally determined, SNAP does allow states that use BBCE to extend eligibility to 
people eligible for alternative programs such as TANF or Medicaid, which have income and 
asset limits that vary by state. Whether states allowed BBCE remained an important indicator of 
breadth of coverage.  
These results would indicate that whatever latent breadth of coverage generosity that 
exists to explain which persons would be eligible for these programs works differently for 
TANF. It seems that latent generosity does not significantly influence asset and income limits for 
TANF, but rather the latent generosity affects the categorical eligibility determinations. The 
types of people or households that are eligible for TANF are the indicators remaining in the 
model, most significantly whether immigrants would be eligible beyond the eligibility mandated 
in federal law (in fact, coverage of immigrants in all three programs are highly important in 
breadth of coverage generosity).  
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Nevertheless, the model of latent generosity of the depth of coverage in these programs 
seems to be a poor conceptualization of any latent construct. A number of the indicators that 
seem to measure the depth of benefits are negatively correlated, especially across programs. 
Latent generosity of depth as initially conceived included a number of indicators for regulations 
or procedures that make it relatively easier or more difficult to comply with program 
administration and so to continue to receive benefits. These indicators included TANF work 
requirements, or whether an applicant would need to have a face-to-face interview to certify their 
income. These indicators are perhaps more properly thought of as manifesting a different type of 
generosity which was part of the third model, that of administrative burden, rather than depth.  
This third model contrasted latent generosity of the burden of administering or navigating 
the program (of the regulations and procedures facing both clients and workers) with the latent 
generosity of the rest of the program, namely the benefits that participants receive, and which 
persons would be eligible. Once again, this model seems to differ by program. The model 
constructing latent generosity of the administrative burden (where more generosity would 
indicate fewer regulations, easier procedures, etc.) is not a particularly good fit (see Table 2.10). 
A review of the results of this model indicates that the administration of SNAP is highly 
explanatory, while that of TANF not only fails to explain much if any of this latent generosity, 
but in fact shows the existence of a diversion program that seems to indicate more generosity for 
this latent variable.  
That a diversion program is correlated with this particular latent concept of generosity is 
understandable, since the administrative burden being measured is not only client facing, but is 
also an indication of the burden put on employees who are responsible for administering the 
program. Although a diversion from TANF was determined to be less generous because its goal 
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would be to keep welfare rolls smaller, the ability for workers to divert households instead of 
having to open a case is a reduction in administrative load.  
The final hypothesized intermediate latent variable was that affecting the 
nonadministrative parts of the programs, which I characterized as representing the generosity of 
actual benefits as well as the generosity of eligibility for the program. Much like the latent 
generosity of the depth of these programs, there was no real correlation between the selected 
indicators. The fact that so many of the hypothesized models were ill fitting or failed to converge 
is telling. Although I might hypothesize a latent generosity that influences the ways in which 
policies and regulations change in these programs, such a construct does not exist across all three 
programs. When the indicators for all programs were combined into joint models, no indication 
was found that any underlying factor affected them jointly. Even within individual programs 
there does not appear to exist an underlying latent generosity, for only SNAP showed any real 
promise as a program model.  
After failing to confirm any of the hypothesized models, I attempted to pare down the 
indicators included according to these failed models. Ultimately, I found that smaller cross-
sections of indicators could be thought of as clustering together (e.g., the indicators surrounding 
asset tests). The elimination of the SNAP asset test through BBCE has recently come under fire 
by the Trump administration (Newman, 2019). Looking at the indicators dealing with asset tests, 
I found that there is likely some latent factor affecting states’ policies towards asset tests (see 
Table 2.11). This model included indicators for whether a state used BBCE; what its applicant 
and recipient asset limits are for TANF; and whether it eliminated asset limits for Medicaid, for 
parents, or for all recipients. Although all of the factor loadings were significant (p < 0.05), the 
R2 values for the SNAP BBCE and the TANF recipient asset limit were not at all significant and 
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the TANF applicant asset limit was significant only at the 0.10 level (p = 0.078). It seems that 
whether a state had eliminated any asset tests for Medicaid was the true indication of this 
underlying asset test generosity, but that underlying generosity did also have some influence on 
how a state choose to set its asset tests for the other two programs.  
Finally, a model containing only three indicators (one for each program) was constructed 
to determine whether the coverage that states provide to noncitizens was driven by an underlying 
latent factor (e.g., perhaps a prevailing attitude towards immigration). I found that some 
underlying construct does exist and that it influences all three programs in a similar way to a 
similar degree (see Table 2.12). This model is perfectly identified; therefore, it does not contain 
any statistics regarding model fit; however, all three, factor loadings are highly significant, as are 
all three R2 values. Whatever is the underlying trait affecting access to the social safety net for 






Single Factor Results for Latent SNAP Generosity  
Indicator Standardized factor loading R2 Model fit information 




FS02 0.556 (0.041) 
0.309 
(0.045) P value 0.0000 
FS03 0.359 (0.036) 
0.129 
(0.026) RMSEA 0.052 




RMSEA <= .05 0.325 
FS05 0.883 (0.019) 
0.780 
(0.034) CFI 0.991 
FS06 0.853 (0.030) 
0.728 
(0.051) TLI 0.989 
FS07 0.324 (0.041) 
0.105 
(0.027) SRMR 0.073 
FS08 0.248 (0.028) 
0.062 
(0.014)   
FS09 0.393 (0.032) 
0.155 
(0.025)   
FS10 0.719 (0.029) 
0.517 
(0.042) Measurement error correlations 
FS12 0.875 (0.018) 
0.765 
(0.032) FS02 with FS09 
0.346 
(0.048) 
FS13 0.456 (0.042) 
0.208 
(0.039) FS04 with FS05 
0.857 
(0.033) 
FS14 0.560 (0.036) 
0.314 
(0.040) FS06 with FS07 
0.571 
(0.078) 
Note: CFI = Comparative fit index; FS =Food Stamps;  RMSEA = Root mean square error of approximation; SNAP 
= Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program; SRMR = Standardized root mean square residual. Standard errors are 
given in parentheses underneath estimates. All coefficients are statistically significant at the p < 0.05 level unless 





Single Factor Results for Latent TANF Generosity 
Indicator Standardized factor loading R2 Model fit information 




TANFD5 0.963 (0.014) 
0.928 
(0.027) P value 0.0000 
TANFD6 0.925 (0.016) 
0.855 
(0.030) RMSEA 0.112 




RMSEA <= .05 0.000 
TANFTEEN 0.114 (0.056) 
0.013 
(0.013) CFI 0.960 
TANFF1 0.060 (0.049) 
0.004 
(0.006) TLI 0.942 
TANFL1 0.483 (0.043) 
0.233 
(0.042) SRMR 0.108 
TANFBV0 -0.230 (0.035) 
0.053 
(0.016)   
TANFIM0 -0.141 (0.048) 
0.020 
(0.014)   
   
Measurement error correlations 
   TANFBV0 with TANFF1 
-0.407 
(0.039) 
   TANFL1 with TANFF1 
0.541 
(0.061) 
Note. CFI = Comparative fit index; RMSEA = Root mean square error of approximation; SRMR = Standardized 






Single Factor Results for Latent Medicaid Generosity 
Indicator Standardized factor loading R2 Model fit information 




MCEL04 0.667 (0.021) 
0.444 
(0.027) P value 0.0000 
MCEL05 0.619 (0.030) 
0.383 
(0.038) RMSEA 0.072 




RMSEA <= .05 0.000 
MCAD01 0.239 (0.039) 
0.057 
(0.018) CFI 0.758 
MCAD03 0.425 (0.049) 
0.181 
(0.042) TLI 0.712 
MCAD04 0.697 (0.051) 
0.486 
(0.071) SRMR 0.117 
MCAD05 0.411 (0.039) 
0.169 
(0.032)   
MCAD06 0.478 (0.044) 
0.229 
(0.042)   
MCAD07 0.093 (0.046) 
0.009* 
(0.009) Measurement error correlations 



































MCMANDCO -0.257 (0.036) 
0.066 
(0.019)   
MCRX -0.093 (0.061) 
0.009* 
(0.011)   
Note. CFI = Comparative fit index; MC = Medicaid; RMSEA = Root mean square error of approximation; SRMR = 





Single Factor Results for Latent Breadth Generosity 
Indicator Standardized factor loading R2 Model fit information 




FS08 0.453 (0.029) 
0.205 
(0.026) P value 0.0000 
FS13 0.550 (0.037) 
0.302 
(0.041) RMSEA 0.076 
TANFPREG 0.290 (0.047) 
0.084 
(0.027) Probability RMSEA <= .05 0.000 
TANFINC1 0.188 (0.039) 
0.035 
(0.015) CFI 0.816 
TANF2PAR 0.230 (0.040) 
0.053 
(0.019) TLI 0.776 
TANFIM0 0.509 (0.037) 
0.259 
(0.038) SRMR 0.091 
MCEL01 0.663 (0.026) 
0.439 
(0.035)   
MCEL03 0.639 (0.027) 
0.408 
(0.034)   
MCEL04 0.723 (0.017) 
0.522 
(0.025) Measurement Error Correlations 







MCEL06 0.499 (0.037) 
0.249 
(0.037) MCEL03 with MCEL01 
0.974 
(0.002) 














MCIM99 0.732 (0.025) 
0.536 
(0.036)   
Note. CFI = Comparative fit index; FS =Food Stamps; MC = Medicaid; RMSEA = Root mean square error of 






Single Factor Results for Latent Administrative Burden Generosity 
Indicator Standardized factor loading R2 Model fit information 




FS02 0.555 (0.039) 
0.308 
(0.043) P value 0.0000 
FS04 0.982 (0.009) 
0.964 
(0.017) RMSEA 0.077 





FS06 0.807 (0.026) 
0.652 
(0.043) CFI 0.946 
FS09 0.449 (0.030) 
0.202 
(0.027) TLI 0.939 
FS10 0.673 (0.031) 
0.453 
(0.041) SRMR 0.113 
FS12 0.849 (0.019) 
0.720 
(0.041)   
FS13 0.404 (0.042) 
0.163 
(0.034)   
TANFD1 -0.185 (0.045) 
0.034 
(0.017) Measurement error correlations 














MCAD04 0.206 (0.053) 
0.042* 
(0.022)   
MCAD05 0.351 (0.041) 
0.123 
(0.029)   
MCAD06 0.241 (0.047) 
0.058 
(0.023)   
MCAD08 0.205 (0.041) 
0.042 
(0.017)   
MCAD09 0.273 (0.079) 
0.074* 
(0.043)   
MCAD10 0.462 (0.050) 
0.214 
(0.046)   
MCAD11 0.263 (0.034) 
0.069 
(0.018)   
MCAD12 0.222 (0.032) 
0.049 
(0.014)   
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Note. CFI = Comparative fit index; FS = Food Stamps; MC = Medicaid; RMSEA = Root mean square error of 
approximation; SRMR = Standardized root mean square residual; TLI = Tucker-Lewis index.  
Table 2.11 
 
Single Factor Results for Latent Generosity of Asset Tests 
Indicator Standardized factor loading R2 Model fit information 




TANFA1 0.200 (0.057) 
0.040 
(0.023) P value 0.0016 
TANFA4 0.147 (0.051) 
0.022* 
(0.015) RMSEA 0.062 





MCAD05 0.805 (0.164) 
0.648 
(0.263) CFI 0.998 
   TLI 0.996 
Measurement error correlations 







Note. CFI = Comparative fit index; FS = Food Stamps; MC = Medicaid; RMSEA = Root mean square error of 
approximation; SRMR = Standardized root mean square residual; TLI = Tucker-Lewis index. 
* Although not significant at p < 0.05 level, this value is significant at the p < 0.10 level. 
Table 2.12 
 
Single Factor Results for Latent Generosity to Noncitizens 























Factor of SNAP Program Generosity 
 















































Figure 2.26  
 
Factor of TANF Program Generosity 
 




































Ultimately, the preferred method for aggregating the social safety net regulations 
database created in Paper 1 was by using a simple index. Despite testing three different 
conceptions of how latent generosity might be influencing observed program regulations and 
administration, I was unable to model accurately this construct. It is possible that a latent 
generosity does underlie the setting of program rules by states; however, the indicators pulled 
from the Paper 1 database cannot explain it using the configurations in my hypothesized models.  
The existence of well-fitting smaller models (e.g., those regarding indicators of asset tests 
or coverage for immigrants) does imply that there might be a multitude of underlying latent traits 
or attitudes that affect administration and regulation of these safety net programs. However, it 
might imply that they do not do so in the same way for all three programs or for all different 
types of indicators. More work must be done to determine exactly which indicators move in 
tandem and so indicate that they are the result of a common latent characteristic of a state-year. It 
is possible that the latter is likely because, although indicators that address the application 
processes have a common underlying trait for SNAP and Medicaid, but not for TANF, yet 
indicators that address income eligibility are commonly motivated for TANF and Medicaid, but 
not for SNAP. The latter occurs because, absent BBCE, SNAP’s income eligibility level (if not 
its certification) is set by the federal government, 
The key difference between constructing a generosity index and a generosity scale was 
the difference in the directionality of generosity’s relationship with the safety net indicators. 
What the above analyses show is that the hypothesized way in which underlying generosity 
would have an impact on the policies of these three safety net programs does not exist in any of 
the ways I predicted that it might; however, the impact of the program indicators on the 
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generosity climate in which program workers and participants exist is undeniable. I cannot say 
with certainty that generosity or some other latent trait causes the variation in the indicators, but 
that the variation in the indicators is assuredly causing changes in the way that the programs are 
experienced. Therefore, the questions surrounding the index are “How much of an impact does 
each indicator have on that experience?” and “Are the indicators included in the Paper 1 database 
sufficient to account entirely for that climate?”  
Future work on the generosity index should focus on explaining the extent of the impact 
of these indicators by validating the score, using measures of employee and participant 
experiences within the social safety net system. If the index is intended to measure the assistance 
climate that is felt by the people within the system, it is important to ask those individuals what 
their experiences are. The naïve index indicates that states in the Northeast and on the Pacific 
coast are the most generous, while the South lags behind: Does this pattern reflect the opinions 
of the people receiving and administering assistance?  
The index can be validated further by combining it with objective outcome measures. The 
original and continuing goal of the Food Stamp Program was to alleviate hunger and to allow all 
Americans access to food. Medicaid was aimed at improving the population’s health and TANF 
was aimed at alleviating poverty among families (along with other goals that came with the 
switch from AFDC to TANF, e.g., helping parents to become employed and reducing the rate of 
out-of-wedlock births). Although the index is not intended to evaluate the success of these 
programs relative to their stated goals, it can in the future be refined by comparing it to certain 
population-level factors that are known to correlate with generous social assistance and by 
measuring the relative contribution of each indicator that composes the index.  
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Although the index as it exists now is a crude measure for the assistance climate, it does 
offer an effective way to include a number of facets of the social safety net into the analyses of 
population outcomes. By aggregating all of the policies measured in Paper 1, the index allows 
researchers a single measure to use in analyzing any number of social or economic indicators. In 
the third and final paper of this dissertation, I employ the index to examine the role of assistance 
policy among the social determinants of public health outcomes, in this case the rate of maternal 





PAPER 3: ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF THE SOCIAL SAFETY NET ON 
MATERNAL BIRTH OUTCOMES ACROSS THE UNITED STATES 
Section 3.1 Social Determinants of Public Health 
Health is more than a combination of biology and medicine; one’s health status and that 
of a society are determined by myriad factors both individual and population-wide. In the last 30 
years, public health scholars have recognized that the inequities in health status can have 
deleterious effects on vulnerable populations, exacerbating existing injustices, and that, in 
ameliorating these inequalities, stakeholders must rely on more than advances in medicine and 
healthcare provision. In this time, scholars have extended focus to the social determinants of 
health as well as the biological and medical ones. With this framework, I recognize that health 
status is determined by a range of factors that are both proximate (individual lifestyle factors, e.g. 
drinking or eating habits) and distal (societal factors, e.g., living conditions and socioeconomic 
environment). Dahlgren and Whitehead (1991) conceived of this layered model that moves from 





Dahlgren and Whitehead Model of Main Determinants of Health 
 
Note. From “Policies and strategies to promote social equity in health. Background document to WHO,” by G. 
Dahlgren, & M. Whitehead, 1991, in Strategy Paper for Europe (pp. 4–41). Institute for Future Studies.  
Inequalities in health often mirror inequalities in other areas (e.g., income or access to 
services; Bonner, 2017; Kawachi, Kennedy, Lochner, & Prothrow-Stith, 1997; Lundberg, 
Yngwe, Stjärne, Elstad, Ferrarini, Kangas, Norström, Palme, & Fritzell, 2008; Income, health, 
and social welfare policies, 2020). In looking beyond individual and biological determinants of 
health, policymakers have the ability to generate large improvements in health inequities by 
targeting other inequities or broader social factors (Blas, Gilson, Kelly, Labonté, Lapitan, 
Muntaner, Östlin, Popay, Sadana, Sen, Schrecker, & Vaghri, 2008; Marmot, Friel, Bell, 
Houweling, & Taylor, 2008; World Health Organization, n.d.). Building on the social 
determinants of health framework, this dissertation attempts to explore the two outer rings of the 
Dahlgren and Whitehead model: general socioeconomic, cultural and environmental conditions 
as well as living and working conditions. It is within these two rings or layers that public policy 
lives, representing the “policy determinants of health” as a subset of broader social determinants.   
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The points at which policy intersects with the social determinants of health model can be 
seen in the Diderichsen model (Diderichsen, Evans, & Whitehead, 2001): 
Figure 3.2 
 
Diderichsen Model of Social and Health Inequities 
 
Note. From “The social basis of disparities in health,” by F. Diderichsen, T. Evans, & M. Whitehead, 2001, in 
Challenging inequities in health (pp. 13-23). Oxford University Press.  
According to this model, public policy has potential to influence individual and 
population health by influencing the degree of social and economic inequality in a society, by 
decreasing an individual’s “exposure” to dangerous risk factors that are correlated with their 
social position, decreasing an individual’s vulnerability to those exposures and preventing 
unequal health outcomes that arise as a consequence of these. Public health scholars, particularly 
 
 90 
the World Health Organization’s Commission on the Social Determinants of Health, have called 
on researchers and policymakers to consider the political and social factors in models like these 
to aim for improvements in population health measures (Blas et al., 2008; Solar & Irwin, 2007).  
Research has been slow to connect the effects of “nonhealth” policies on health outcomes 
(Rudolph, Caplan, Ben-Moshe, & Dillon, 2013). A great deal of research has been focused on 
state variation in the “social determinants” of health, most notably state-level income inequality; 
however, few, if any, researchers examine how redistributive policies correlate with health 
outcomes—the so-called “causes of the causes” (Olson, Diekema, Elliott, & Renier, 2010; Pega, 
Kawachi, Rasanathan, & Lundberg, 2013). Social safety net programs constitute the major 
sources of income redistribution in the United States; therefore, they affect proximal and distal 
determinants of health through direct mechanisms (increased access to income, nutritious food, 
and medical care); indirect mechanisms (including stress, stigma, economic insecurity); and 
contextual effects (decreased poverty and inequality and increased and social capital; (Kawachi 
et al., 1997; Pickett, 2002; Soss, 1999). Where states have been granted discretion in determining 
eligibility for and monetary support of these safety net benefits, it is possible to examine these 
state laws to assess welfare generosity. Researchers have begun to examine the direct health 
effect of participation in individual state programs; however, in their studies, they have not 
looked to the overall social welfare generosity of a state (combining the effects of multiple laws) 
on the environment necessary for public health (Wise, Chavkin, & Romero, 1999). Therefore, 
my contention is that these jurisdictional differences in policies (statutory or procedurally) lead 
to differences in health outcomes because the assistance that people receive can vary so widely.  
In looking at the outermost rings of the social determinants of health (SDH) model, one 
can see how the “generosity” of social policy influences public health. Where it has long been 
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understood that sociodemographic status is a fundamental underlying determinant of health 
outcomes, the generosity of a social welfare system is thought to provide social protection and to 
affect health outcomes independent of household income. Although, household income and other 
personal factors lie within the two smallest layers or rings of the Dahlgren and Whitehead model, 
the robustness of a society’s social services lies further out. As the United States has delegated 
the administration of many social safety net programs to the states, these subnational entities are 
now increasingly responsible for establishing the eligibility, enrollment, and the value of benefits 
for these safety net programs, as well as for their administration. Thus, the combined effect of 
these laws, policies, and regulations can perhaps serve as a measure of the generosity of a state’s 
social welfare system. This effect of the wider social welfare environment raises an imperative to 
study the range of redistributive safety net policies across the states. 
In this paper, I use the measure of welfare generosity created in the previous paper as an 
independent variable in an analysis of a particular public health outcome, maternal morbidity. 
Maternal health and infant health are some of the most important population health indicators, 
and they are very much socially determined. Numerous studies have already applied the social 
determinants of health framework to perinatal health, looking at how political, social, and 
economic factors affect maternal and infant mortality. The latter, in particular infant mortality, is 
found to be very sensitive to public health investment and intervention (Bradley, Elkins, Herrin, 
& Elbel, 2011; Chung & Muntaner, 2006; Conley & Springer, 2001).  
Birth outcomes, like other health indicators, depend most immediately on the quality and 
type of medical care that a mother3 receives, as well as preexisting risk factors attributable 
                                               
3 In this paper, I will refer to “women” and “mothers” when discussing pregnancy and perinatal health; however, 
this is merely in deference to the convention within the literature cited. I would like to acknowledge that not all 
those who become pregnant or bear children identify as women. 
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largely to genetics and to the mother’s baseline health status. However, even a mother’s 
preexisting health status as well as population, rather than individual, biological risk factors can 
be thought of as more intermediate determinants of birth outcomes, along with prenatal care, 
health behaviors and the environment in which gestation happens. These intermediate factors are 
influenced by the more distal social determinants of health, as illustrated in Figure 3.3. Mothers 
who are of a lower social or economic position within society, in addition to lacking adequate 
medical coverage and often being in worse health at the outset, are subject to environmental 
factors and engage in health behaviors that are associated with worse health at birth for infants 
(Aizer & Currie, 2014). The intermediary determinants that create the pregnancy environment do 
very much depend on social and economic status; a mother’s social status as well as the 
differential effect on pregnancy and birth exerted by her social position can be determined or 
ameliorated through social and health policy.  
With this framework, I demonstrate how social policies and governance can affect a 
society’s degree of social stratification, especially of the material and social environments in 
which a mother becomes pregnant. Within this framework, social policy is a more distal 
determinant of birth outcomes, although it also plays a role that is proximate through health 
policy. This role is most notable through public provision of public health coverage (see Figure 
3.3), which allows for access to and better quality of the healthcare and prenatal care to which 





Kim and Saada Framework of Social Determinants of Infant Mortality 
 
Note. From “The social determinants of infant mortality and birth outcomes in western 
developed nations: A cross-country systematic review,” by D. Kim, & A. Saada, 2013, 





Chung and Muntaner Model of Political Determinants of Health Outcomes  
 
Note. From “Political and welfare state determinants of infant and child health indicators: 
An analysis of wealthy countries,” by H. Chung, & C. Muntaner, 2006, Social Science and 
Medicine, 63(3), 829–842.  
The prevailing conceptual framework examining the determinants of maternal mortality 
fails to consider the influence of policy on maternal health. Although the distant determinants in 
McCarthy and Maine’s (1992) model refer to socioeconomic and cultural factors, their more 
detailed enumeration of those factors makes no mention of prevailing public policies, nor does 
their enumeration of intermediate determinants refer to social safety net policies that affect a 
woman’s health status, access to health services or use of health services (see Figure 3.4). 
Although reference is made to conditions that public policy affects (e.g., the social and legal 
rights of women in society, or the resources available in a community), the explicit role that 
safety net policies in particular can play in influencing maternal health is missing. In part, this 
might be because the framework (as initially conceived) was not meant to apply exclusively to 
the United States, whose enormous wealth and relatively high mortality ratio make it a unique 
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case in a field where much of the research on societal and economic determinants of mortality 
arise much more frequently in poorer countries or regions.  
Figure 3.5 
 
McCarthy and Maine Framework of Determinants of Maternal Mortality  
 
Note. From “A Framework for analyzing the determinants of maternal mortality,” J. McCarthy, & D. Maine, 1992, 
Studies in Family Planning, 23(1), 23.  
An alternative framework for examining the social determinants of maternal health 
(rather than broader population or infant health) within the context of a wealthy society like the 
United States would be to consider everything beyond access to and quality delivery of 
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healthcare to be more distally influential on a mother’s health and that of her infant. The system-
wide decisions that surround healthcare policy and financing are so critical at every step along 
the “continuum of maternity care” that even the social and material environment in which a 
mother carries out her pregnancy is more distal to the birth outcome (see Figure 3.6). This model 
is unlike previous models of maternal mortality in which the mother’s socioeconomic status is 
second only to her health status in determining her risk of adverse birth outcomes (Filippi, Chou, 
Barreix, Say, & the WHO Maternal Morbidity Working Group, 2018). 
Regardless of the chosen framework, it is clear that the generosity of social safety net 
programs as measured in Paper 2 can have an impact on maternal health. Although Medicaid 
obviously affects prenatal and healthcare delivery, it also plays a role (along with SNAP, TANF 
and other social assistance or income transfer programs) in determining the mother’s preexisting 
health status, the environment in which she is pregnant, and her social and economic status, as 
well as population-wide inequality and deprivation.  
MCH is critical not only because it is sensitive to state interventions as a health outcome, 
but also because infants who are born healthy to healthy mothers are advantageously positioned 
for the rest of their lives. Investments by policymakers in MCH can produce double dividends by 
improving health of mother and child in the near term and of the child throughout its life long 
term. The Fetal Origins of Adult Disease hypothesis holds that certain risk factors for a number 
of chronic health conditions in adulthood depend on the development in utero and can be 
affected by nutrition and stress (Almond & Currie, 2011; Barker, 1995, 1999; Calkins & 
Devaskar, 2011). Low birthweight (LBW) infants have worse life outcomes, both immediately, 
with LBW infants at higher risk of mortality within the 1st year, and long term, with worse 
educational or earnings prospects (Aizer & Currie, 2014; Black, Devereux, & Salvanes, 2007). 
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The effects of LBW infants continue even into the next generations, as a mother who was born at 
a LBW is much more likely to have a child who is also of LBW (Currie & Moretti, 2007). The 
Diderichsen model (Figure 3.2) shows how poor health and its social consequences are part of a 
feedback loop that leads to further social stratification and that serves as an input to the social 
determinants of health framework (Diderichsen et al., 2001). In this way, policy interventions 
that target gestation can have impacts not only on lower or more microlevel health determinants, 
but also on higher level or more macrolevel factors.  
Figure 3.6 
 
Alternative Conceptual Model of Social Determinants of Maternal Health  
 
Note. From Birth settings in America: Outcomes, quality, access, and choice (S. C. 
Scrimshaw & E. P. Backes, Eds.), by Committee on Assessing Health Outcomes by Birth 
Settings, Board on Children, Youth, and Families, Division of Behavioral and Social 
Sciences and Education, Health and Medicine Division, and National Academies of 
Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, 2020. National Academies Press.  
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Section 3.2 A New Theoretical Framework for Maternal Health 
Integrating the aforementioned perinatal health frameworks with the broader social 
determinants of health frameworks referenced in Paper 1, in this paper, I employ a theoretical 
framework to guide the analysis. In this framework, I envision concentric circles in which each 
circle has an impact on the smaller circles fitted within it. The outermost circles can be thought 
of as the macrolevel factors that influence the intermediary factors and that in turn influence the 
microlevel factors. Each level can be influenced by not only the level immediately superior to it, 
















































The outcome of interest is maternal mortality. According to the Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention (CDC; 2020), pregnancy related deaths in the United States peaked in 
2014, with 18 deaths per 100,000 live births. The latest data from 2016 shows a ratio of 16.9 
deaths per 100,000 live births. Between 2011 and 2016, the leading causes of pregnancy-related 
deaths were hemorrhage, infection, cardiomyopathy, and other cardiovascular conditions (CDC, 
Division of Reproductive Health, 2020a). Although hemorrhage was long the leading cause of 
maternal death, its proportion has been falling and in recent years, the fraction of deaths caused 
by diseases of the heart and blood vessels has increased such that they are now the leading cause 
of maternal death (Callaghan, 2012). Cardiovascular-related maternal deaths are even more 
strongly affected by preexisting conditions and by the factors listed in my framework. The 
shifting burden of maternal death towards these more socially determined conditions means that 
understanding these social determinants is more important than ever.  
Pregnancy-related mortality in the United States has been increasing in the 21st century 
following a century of decline. Not all of the increase is rooted in the social determinants 
framework. Some of the increase can be attributed to exogenous factors, including increased 
detection of maternal deaths because of changes in American death certificates and advancing 
maternal age as women choose to start families later in life than their counterparts in previous 
generations (pregnancies in women over Age 35 and especially over Age 40 are inherently 
riskier). However, the fact remains that the risk of maternal death is higher now than it was 20 
years ago (Berg, 2012; Berg, Callaghan, Syverson, & Henderson, 2010; Callaghan, 2012; 
Creanga, Berg, Ko, Farr, Tong, Bruce, & Callaghan, 2014; Creanga, Berg, Syverson, Seed, 
Bruce, & Callaghan, 2015; MacDorman, Declercq, Cabral, & Morton, 2016).  
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The leading causes of maternal death are hemorrhage, infection, amniotic fluid embolism, 
thrombotic pulmonary embolism, hypertensive disorders, complications from anesthesia, 
cerebrovascular accident, cardiomyopathy, other cardiovascular conditions and other 
noncardiovascular health conditions (CDC, Division of Reproductive Health, 2020a). Although 
some of these deaths are unavoidable and tragic consequences of childbirth, which always has an 
attached risk, it is hypothesized that anywhere from 40% to 66% of maternal deaths in the U.S. 
are preventable (Berg, 2012; Berg, Harper, Atkinson, Bell, Brown, Hage, Mitra, Moise, & 
Callaghan, 2005; Davis, Smoots, & Goodman, 2019; Petersen, Davis, Goodman, Cox, Mayes, 
Johnston, Syverson, Seed, Shapiro-Mendoza, Callaghan, & Barfield, 2019). Some strategies to 
reduce these deaths are related to implementing obstetric best practices and relying on hospitals 
and other medical providers to act; however, a number of these avoidable deaths are rooted in 
social disparities that expose mothers of different socioeconomic statuses or racial and ethnic 
groups to differential risk of experiencing maternal morbidity or mortality.  
Perhaps the greatest indication that maternal mortality is largely socially determined is 
the enormous racial disparities that exist. The maternal mortality ratio is 3–4 times higher for 
non-Hispanic Black women than it is for non-Hispanic White women, and it is also up to 2 times 
higher for indigenous (Native American and Alaska Native) women than for non-Hispanic White 
women (Bryant, Worjoloh, Caughey, & Washington, 2010; Creanga et al., 2014, 2015; 
Kozhimannil, Interrante, Tofte, & Admon, 2020; Louis, Interrante, Tofte, & Admon, 2015; 
Metcalfe et al., 2018). In fact, the leading causes of maternal mortality differ by race, with White 
women more likely to die of conditions such as hemorrhage and infection, while Black women 
are more likely to die of cardiomyopathy and preeclampsia or eclampsia, where the latter 
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conditions have strong associations with a mother’s preexisting health status in a way that the 
former do not (Davis et al., 2019).  
Race certainly has a direct effect on a mother’s health both before and during pregnancy 
and childbirth: exposure to the structural racism underlying American society puts stress on 
Black women, increasing allostatic load and causing a “weathering” effect that gets worse with 
age. Furthermore, Black women’s past experiences with the medical system, both personally and 
as a group, are often the cause of mistrust and avoidance of seeking care (Geronimus, 1996; 
Louis et al., 2015; Rosenthal & Lobel, 2011; Wallace, Harville, Theall, Webber, Chen, & 
Berenson, 2013). Race also has an indirect effect in that it affects numerous other social 
determinants, from residential segregation driving neighborhood characteristics to the generosity 
of a state’s welfare program (states with higher Black populations tend to operate less generous 
TANF programs; Hahn, Aron, Lou, Pratt, & Okoli, 2017; Wallace et al., 2013).  
Other factors leading to differential rates of maternal mortality include geography, 
income, education, and insurance status, many of which affect one another in turn. Low-income 
women and those with a high school education or less are likelier to lack access to adequate 
nutrition, housing, and medical care, not least because they are less likely to have insurance. 
These factors affect not only a woman’s health during pregnancy, but also have a huge impact on 
her baseline level of health. Poor preconception health leads to a higher risk of maternal death, 
especially conditions such as hypertension, diabetes, and obesity which are in themselves 
associated with low socioeconomic status. Lack of education and insurance can also lead to 
riskier health behaviors (e.g., smoking or failure to seek prenatal care), which can also lead to 
adverse birth outcomes (Creanga et al., 2014; Nelson, Moniz, & Davis, 2018).  
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Where a woman lives will often end up having huge impacts on her risk of maternal 
death. Rural residents have much less access to hospitals and specialized medical care, especially 
in recent years as more and more hospitals in rural areas shut down or cut back their services. 
Many rural areas lack appropriate obstetric care, and as a result, childbirth is a riskier proposition 
in those areas, especially if a delivery requires extreme intervention (Kozhimannil, Hung, 
Henning-Smith, Casey, &, 2018, Kozhimannil et al., 2020). In addition to proximity to care, 
where a mother resides affects her risk because of a number of policies that are made at the state 
level.  
Although calls for a national maternal mortality review committee (MMRC) have been 
increasing, a number of states have established their own bodies tasked with undertaking a 
review of maternal deaths in that state, with the goal of understanding what can be done 
differently to reduce the number of those deaths (Berg, 2012; Clark & Belfort, 2017). Currently, 
25 states are working with the CDC to run their own MMRCs through their ERASE MM 
initiative in addition to maternal mortality reviews that take place outside of this framework. 
Within larger states, localities even conduct their own processes for reviewing maternal deaths. 
Evidence from countries with existing bodies in place to review maternal deaths demonstrates 
the benefit of these committees (CDC, Division of Reproductive Health, 2020b; Lewis, 2012).  
States play an enormous role in the types of support offered to mothers. From traditional 
safety net programs such as SNAP, Medicaid, and TANF, to more specialized programs like 
WIC, decisions by policymakers at the state-level might mean that women in states offering 
greater assistance could have a lower risk of maternal death. However, although theoretically 
reasonable and in line with the maternal mortality frameworks, the evidence for this does not yet 
exist. Most of the research on determinants of maternal mortality focuses on individual or facility 
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level determinants. Evidence from MMRCs, which has been of enormous benefit, has focused on 
the intersection of mothers and the healthcare system. MMRCs often involve a number of 
obstetricians reviewing cases of maternal death to see how it could have been avoided. There is 
nothing in a case review by a physician that can speak to the role of social policy. 
Much of the research involving maternal mortality is carried out at the individual level, 
looking at individual risk factors for experiencing an adverse maternal birth outcome. Some of 
these factors are largely exogenous to social determinants (e.g., parity), while some are clear 
manifestations of social determinants (e.g., race or ethnicity). However, state-level analyses of 
maternal mortality are lacking. Only in the last few years has variation in states’ maternal 
mortality ratios are being probed using state-level data (Eliason, 2020; Nelson et al., 2018; Vilda, 
Wallace, Dyer, Harville, & Theall, 2019). These few studies have shown an association between 
state-level factors (e.g., Medicaid expansion and state-level income inequality with maternal 
mortality), but none have yet tested the impact of more than one safety net program or their 
relative generosity.  
Section 3.3 Analysis 
The treatment variable of interest for this analysis is the generosity of a state’s social 
safety net, as measured using the naïve index constructed in Paper 2. The outcome of interest is 
the maternal mortality ratio. The data on maternal deaths come from the National Center for 
Health Statistics’ (NCHS; 2017a) Vital Statistics System. NCHS’s detailed mortality files 
contain an entry of every death recorded in the United States in a given year, including basic 
demographic information about the decedent, information about their cause of death (both the 
underlying cause of death as well as conditions occurring in sequence that led to death), 
geographic information (the limited geography files include only the state where it occurred) 
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and, in some although not all cases, information on whether the decedent was pregnant at the 
time or death or within the previous year.  
Information on cause of death as well as comorbid conditions were recorded by the 
Division of Vital Statistics, using the International Statistical Classification of Diseases and 
Related Health Problems 10th Revision (ICD 10), a three-digit code consisting of a letter, which 
indicates the broader category of the disease or condition, followed by a two-digit number 
indicating the specific condition or disease (the three-digit categories can be further subdivided 
into four-digit subcategories in which an additional number is added to the original code 
following a period). Conditions related to “pregnancy, childbirth and the puerperium” are coded 
from O00 to O99, and code A34 for “obstetrical tetanus” can also be considered a maternal death 
(World Health Organization, 2019). Although many studies of maternal mortality do not 
consider deaths coded as O96 (deaths from obstetric causes occurring more than 42 days, but less 
than 1 year after childbirth) and O97 (deaths from sequelae of obstetric causes) to be maternal 
deaths, I have chosen to include them because I am not only interested in deaths occurring 
immediately or directly following childbirth, but deaths that are in any way related to having 
given birth. Data regarding the number of births in a state in each year were gathered from the 
limited geography natality files from NCHS (2017b).  
I generated two different estimates of the maternal mortality ratio. In the first estimate, I 
counted only deaths that were directly attributed to an obstetric cause. In the expanded MMR, I 
counted not only deaths where the underlying cause of death was coded as A34 or from O00–
O99, but also deaths in which one of those codes was indicated on the death certificate even if it 
was not the underlying cause of death. Although it is possible that this process led to my 
capturing some deaths that were unrelated to the pregnancy, it is unlikely that a significant 
 
 106 
number of death certificates in which the death was unrelated to pregnancy or childbirth included 
codes reserved for conditions arising therein.  
For both births and deaths, I generated two types of measures: those occurring in the state 
and measures applying to residents of that state. Death certificate data includes not only the state 
of occurrence, but also the state in which the decedent lived; the same is true for birth certificate 
data, which contains the mother’s state of residence as well as the state where the birth took 
place. Safety net programs are only available to individuals in the state where they reside; 
therefore, the “treatment” of interest in this analysis—the generosity of a particular state’s safety 
net—is more accurately judged to have affected residents of a particular state, regardless of 
where they gave birth or died, rather than those whose labor and delivery or death occurred in 
that state.  
Selection of other variables of interest drew primarily from Nelson et al.’s (2018) 
analysis of population-level factors that are associated with American maternal mortality. The 
factors that were individually associated with state-level MMRs addressed the proportion of 
births to women carrying a number of different risk factors (e.g., certain health conditions, 
advanced age, Black race, or delivery via cesarean) as well as state demographic characteristics 
(e.g., the uninsurance rate among women of childbearing age or the median household income). 
Ultimately, the authors were able to explain 91% of the variation in state-level maternal 
mortality using six indicators:  
• whether a state had adopted the 2003 revision to the death certificate by 2011; 
• the proportion of women of childbearing age with a BMI ≥ 30; 
• the proportion of births to women with diabetes; 
• the proportion of women of childbearing age not having completed high school/GED; 
 
 107 
• the proportion of births to women who attended fewer than 10 prenatal visits; 
• the proportion of births to Black women. 
Data on the proportion of births to women with a particular characteristic (whether health 
status or race) were also generated using the limited geography natality files (NCHS, 2017b). 
Estimates on the demographics and population of each state were generated using data from the 
Surveillance, Epidemiology, and End Results Program on the American population from 1966–
2018 (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, National Institutes of Health, National 
Cancer Institute, Division of Cancer Control and Population, Surveillance Research Program, 
2019). Additional state-level data on social safety net programs as well as poverty and 
employment rates in each state were gathered from national welfare data at the University of 
Kentucky Center for Poverty Research (2020). Natality data are only accessible through 20124; 
therefore, the timeline of the observations is for the years 2005–2012. Data on educational 
attainment for women as well as obesity rates were attained from the Behavioral Risk Factor 
Surveillance System at the CDC’s (2015) National Center for Chronic Disease Prevention and 
Health Promotion, Division of Population Health.  
The data regarding whether a state had implemented the 2003 revised death certificate is 
not easily available. Although Nelson et al. (2018) received this information from contact with 
individuals at NCHS and the CDC, restrictions put into place because of COVID-19 meant that 
this avenue was not easily available to me. The best proxy I was able to render for whether a 
state had adopted the 2003 revision of the death certificate was whether an individual’s death 
record in the mortality files contained an observation for the level of education according to the 
                                               
4 Although natality data exists in every year, technical difficulties accessing the data through NCHS, especially 
following the outbreak of COVID-19 (Coronavirus Disease 2019), meant that I was unable to receive uncorrupted 
files for years after 2012 or before 2005. 
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2003 revision, instead of an observation for education according to the 1989 revision; for every 
recorded death contained an observation for one of these two indicators. 
Between 2005 and 2016, in nine state-years some but not all of the death certificates were 
issued in the 2003 revised version; these years indicate the time during which the state was 
changing from the 1989 revision of the death certificate to the 2003 revision. In these transition 
years, 5% to 78% of the death certificates issued were by a state in which the new revision was 
used. Nelson et al. (2018) used a single indicator for whether a state had adopted the 2003 
revision by 2011 (37 states, if they are including Minnesota, adopted the certificate in 2011 and 
issued 78% of its death certificates using the revised version). In any case, Nelson et al.’s 
intention was to explain the large jump in maternal mortality over a specific time period, while I 
am attempting to look at variation across time and space; therefore, I used an indicator for each 
state year that indicated the proportion of the death certificates that were issued in a state in a 
year that in which the state used the 2003 version.  
Table 3.1  
 
Adoption of 2003 Revision of Standard Death Certificate 
Adopted 2003 Revised Death 
Certificate prior to 2005 
California, Connecticut, Florida, Idaho, Kansas, Michigan, Montana, Nebraska, 
New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Utah, 
Washington, Wyoming 
2005 District of Columbia (77%) 
2006 New Mexico, Oregon, Rhode Island, Texas 
2007 Delaware, Ohio 
2008 Arkansas, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Nevada, North Dakota, Vermont (50%) 
2010 Arizona, Kentucky (56%), Maine (5%), Missouri,  
2011 Iowa, Minnesota (78%) 
2012 Louisiana (49%), Mississippi, Pennsylvania, Tennessee,  
Never adopted 2003 Revised 
Death Certificate 
Alabama, Alaska, Colorado, Hawaii, Maryland, Massachusetts, North Carolina, 
Virginia, West Virginia, Wisconsin 
 
In this analysis, I employed  multilevel maximum likelihood regression with a random 
intercept to account for the clustering of yearly data within states, continuing the analysis that 
Nelson et al. (2018) began. However, I did not limit deaths to those within 42 days of delivery or 
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exclude deaths from sequelae of obstetric causes; therefore, the actual maternal mortality ratio 
that I employ is slightly different from theirs. Using the factors that Nelson et al. found to be 
important determinants of maternal deaths as well as my generosity estimates from the naïve 
index created in Paper 2, I was able to construct models for both the extended MMR (which was 
calculated from death certificates that mentioned an obstetric cause whether it was the 
underlying cause of death) as well as for the limited MMR (which confined deaths to those that 
listed an underlying obstetric cause of death). These two different maternal mortality ratios 
finally had distinctly different determinants.  
In both cases, the most important determinant of maternal mortality by far was the 
percentage of death certificates issued using the 2003 revision. Additional factors that were 
significant in Nelson et al.’s (2018) earlier model (either individually or jointly) were not 
significant in my models, with the exception of the proportion of the female population with a 
BMI ≥ 30 for the extended MMR, and the proportion of births to Black women for the restricted 
MMR (see Tables 3.5–3.6). Although I initially included a year fixed effect, and found that the 
latter years of the panel in particular had significantly higher mortality, the effect of those years 
vanished with the inclusion of the birth certificate revision variable, leading me to believe that 
much of that increased mortality was in fact increased detection of pregnancy-related deaths.  
Race Stratified Analysis 
One cannot discuss maternal mortality in the United States without acknowledging the 
enormous racial disparities, and evidence that the causes of Black and White maternal mortality 
are different means that the determinants of the Black maternal mortality ratio are perhaps 
different from the determinants of the White maternal mortality ratio. Prior analyses have almost 
all been conducted at the individual level; therefore, a mother’s race is easily included as an 
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individual risk factor for morbidity or mortality. However, state-level analyses have rarely 
looked at the racial differences. Nelson et al. (2018) looked at the proportion of births to Black 
women; however, that analysis did not reach the fundamental ways in which White and Black 
maternal mortality differ.  
Vilda et al. (2019) found that a determinant could be statistically significant for Black 
maternal mortality, while remaining insignificant for White mortality. I stratified the models 
fitted by race, using non-Hispanic White MMRs and non-Hispanic Black MMRs in separate 
analyses. This necessarily required me to drop the proportion of births to Black women as a 
control in my limited MMR model. Black MMRs have such enormous variance; therefore, I ran 
the models both with the extreme outliers and without them. I also considered whether all of the 
state-years with zero recorded Black mortality were “true zeros” or whether the zeros occurred 
simply because the state had a very small Black population. I coded the Black MMRs as missing 
in states in which less than 5% of the female population was Black (19 states in every year, as 
well as Minnesota in 2 years). This also addressed outliers so that the distribution of MMRs was 
no longer highly skewed.  
Some states have such a smaller number of births to Black women in a given year, for 
even one Black maternal death can represent a huge proportion of those births and lead to an 
extremely high MMR in that state-year. Therefore, the maximum value for Black maternal 
mortality was more than 750 deaths per 100,000 live births (see Table 3.3). Nevertheless, 
although the Black MMR was certainly multiples higher than the White MMR, it was not seven 
times higher, or the extreme outlying values that occurred in South Dakota, New Hampshire and 
Idaho. All states in which the Black MMRs were greater than 125 deaths per 100,000 live births 
occurred have female populations that are less than 10% Black.  
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Section 3.4 Results 
Included below are the results of the multilevel, maximum likelihood estimation 
regression that was carried out on the births and deaths that occurred within a state. It is worth 
noting that the revised death certificate indicator included in these models is much more 
applicable to analysis carried out on the maternal mortality ratio of maternal deaths to live births 
that occurred in that state, rather than for residents of a state, for the death certificate is issued by 
the state in which a person dies rather than the state in which they lived. However, so much of 
the variation in mortality ratios is attributable to the death certificate revision (see Tables 3.11–
12); therefore, it is illogical to carry out analysis that does not include that information. For this 
reason, although I carried out the analysis using state residents rather than occurrences, I kept in 
the variable that indicated the death certificate revision because, most births and deaths occur in 
the state in which one resides. The results of these analyses are included in Appendix 3, while 
the discussion in this paper is contained in the analysis of births and deaths occurring in a state.  
Included in appendix 4 are the results of the fixed-effects versions of each model, both 
with and without year fixed effects as well as state fixed effects. These results differ from those 
presented below in that they show no real effects of safety net generosity on maternal mortality.   
Analysis of States using 2003 Revised Death Certificates Throughout 
Because so much of the variation in MMR is attributable to the 2003 revision of the death 
certificate, I chose to carry out my analysis on the subset of states that used only the revised 
death certificate in every year included in the data (see table 3.1). These results are included after 
the results of the full sample, and they do not include a measure of revised death certificates, 




Table 3.2  
 
Summary Statistics of State Characteristics 
 Mean SD Min Max 
Generosity score 51.52 8.16 35.54 74.06 
Proportion of women with BMI ≥ 30 0.26 0.04 0.17 0.37 
Proportion of women with less than a HS 
degree 0.10 0.04 0.04 0.20 
Median household income in thousands 
(2018 dollars) 58.80 9.01 40.15 84.97 
Note. N = 408. BMI = Body mass index; HS = High school; SD = standard deviation. 
Table 3.3 
 
Summary Statistics of the Proportion of Births to Mothers with Risk-Factors 
 Occurring in a state Among residents of a state 
 Mean SD Min Max Mean SD Min Max 
Chronic 
hypertension 0.0137 0.0054 0.0042 0.0340 0.0137 0.0053 0.0042 0.0351 
Over 40 years of age 0.0253 0.0095 0.0118 0.0589 0.0252 0.0090 0.0120 0.0555 
Diabetes 0.0485 0.0129 0.0182 0.0930 0.0485 0.0127 0.0189 0.0933 
Pregnancy-related 
hypertension 0.0448 0.0112 0.0173 0.0829 0.0448 0.0109 0.0195 0.0799 
C-section 0.3069 0.0413 0.2068 0.4033 0.3071 0.0406 0.2082 0.4023 
Fewer than 10 
prenatal visits 0.2517 0.0710 0.0570 0.4352 0.2529 0.0709 0.0592 0.4339 
Black, non-Hispanic 0.1308 0.1184 0.0036 0.4877 0.1326 0.1231 0.0036 0.5776 





Maternal Mortality Ratios by Race  
 
Occurring within a state Among residents of a state 
Mean SD Max Mean SD Max 
Total MMR 25.87 17.45 96.41 26.15 17.57 97.36 
Total MMR, limited to UCOD 15.91 10.61 57.94 16.19 11.13 70.40 
White MMR 22.64 17.42 99.13 22.72 17.39 99.24 
White MMR, limited to 
UCOD 12.54 10.40 59.69 12.57 11.07 88.61 
Black MMR 41.01 62.20 760.46 40.79 62.57 772.20 
Black MMR, limited to 
UCOD 30.76 49.60 552.49 30.70 49.95 549.45 
Hispanic MMR 18.49 39.82 477.33 17.14 30.23 269.54 
Hispanic MMR, limited to 
UCOD 11.15 26.26 303.03 10.99 23.95 249.38 
Note. N = 408. MMR = maternal mortality ratio; SD = standard deviation; UCOD = underlying cause of death. The 
minimum maternal mortality ratio for all categories is zero, as there are a number of states with no maternal deaths 






Results for Extended Maternal Mortality 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
MMR MMR MMR MMR MMR 
Generosity -0.0932 
    
 
(0.112) 
    
Revised 18.83*** 18.49*** 18.75*** 18.55*** 18.65*** 
 
(1.864) (1.866) (1.781) (1.829) (1.841) 
High BMI 1.016*** 0.983*** 1.009*** 0.941*** 0.956** 
 




















   
-0.0481 -0.0258 
    
(0.11) (0.115) 
_Cons -6.605 -9.798 -1.303 -6.613 0.581 
 
(7.913) (6.935) (8.026) (10.1) (10.79) 
Χ2 135.16*** 133.79*** 140.74*** 134.26*** 141.10*** 
R2 0.3074 0.3005 0.3254 0.3038 0.3269 
Note. N = 408. BMI = body mass index; MMR = maternal mortality ratio. Standard errors in parentheses 





Results for Limited Maternal Mortality 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
MMR MMR MMR MMR MMR 
Generosity -0.168* 
    
 
(0.0661) 
    
Revised 10.18*** 10.04*** 9.640*** 9.707*** 10.13*** 
 
(1.12) (1.135) (1.098) (1.114) (1.12) 
Black population 27.08*** 27.77*** 24.97*** 25.71*** 26.54*** 
 




















   
-0.0783 -0.0436 
    
(0.0575) (0.058) 
_Cons 15.11*** 10.26*** 12.38*** 11.29*** 15.89*** 
 
(3.396) (2.026) (3.045) (3.34) (3.98) 
Χ2 97.50*** 92.23*** 92.96*** 89.79*** 98.63*** 
R2 0.2621 0.2529 0.2548 0.2493 0.2640 
Note. N = 408. MMR = maternal mortality ratio. Standard errors in parentheses 





Results for Extended White Maternal Mortality  
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
MMR MMR MMR MMR MMR 
Generosity -0.0582 
    
 
(0.113) 
    
Revised 17.82*** 17.50*** 17.91*** 17.62*** 17.69*** 
 
(1.895) (1.896) (1.805) (1.862) (1.862) 
High BMI 0.883** 0.844** 0.883*** 0.845** 0.818** 
 




















   
-0.0191 -0.0129 
    
(0.109) (0.114) 
_Cons -7.586 -9.784 -1.306 -8.423 -0.129 
 
(8.096) (6.978) (8.067) (10.25) (10.84) 
Χ2 113.89*** 113.08*** 120.18*** 113.30*** 120.76*** 
R2 0.2808 0.2760 0.3013 0.2778 0.3026 
Note. N = 408. BMI = body mass index; MMR = maternal mortality ratio; SNAP = Supplemental Nutrition 
Assistance Program; TANF = Temporary Assistance to Needy Families. Standard errors in parentheses. 






Results for Limited White Maternal Mortality  
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
MMR MMR MMR MMR MMR 
Generosity -0.206** 
    
 
(0.0676) 
    
Revised 8.836*** 8.623*** 8.286*** 8.262*** 8.754*** 
 




















   
-0.0809 -0.0357 
    
(0.059) (0.0578) 
_Cons 18.06*** 12.07*** 15.44*** 12.25*** 19.30*** 
 
(3.45) (2.039) (2.866) (3.314) (3.89) 
Χ2 62.25*** 55.62*** 61.10*** 52.30*** 66.26*** 
R2 0.1791 0.1624 .1781 .1579 .1877 
Note. N = 408. MMR = maternal mortality ratio; SNAP = Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program; TANF = 
Temporary Assistance to Needy Families. Standard errors in parentheses. 






Results for Extended Black Maternal Mortality 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
MMR MMR MMR MMR MMR 
Generosity 0.214 
    
 
(0.246) 
    
Revised 24.22*** 24.80*** 24.82*** 24.49*** 24.20*** 
 
(4.026) (3.991) (3.903) (3.946) (4.024) 
High BMI 1.191* 1.123* 1.169* 1.439* 1.350* 
 




















   
0.187 0.147 
    
(0.215) (0.232) 
_Cons -9.712 -0.475 -5.705 -15.93 -17.43 
 
(19.06) (15.16) (17.4) (24.24) (24.8) 
Χ2 50.82*** 49.86*** 50.22*** 50.77*** 51.19*** 
R2 0.2171 0.2124 0.2132 0.2166 0.2183 
Note. N = 254. MMR = maternal mortality ratio; SNAP = Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program; TANF = 
Temporary Assistance to Needy Families. Standard errors in parentheses. 





Results for Limited Black Maternal Mortality  
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
MMR MMR MMR MMR MMR 
Generosity 0.208 
    
 
(0.196) 
    
Revised 16.05*** 16.57*** 16.65*** 16.50*** 16.06*** 
 




















   
0.116 0.0904 
    
(0.143) (0.145) 
_Cons 15.3 22.27*** 19.67* 19.35* 14 
 
(10.05) (6.19) (7.959) (8.148) (10.66) 
Χ2 32.12*** 30.89*** 31.21*** 31.17*** 32.23*** 
R2 0.1425 0.1373 0.1383 0.1378 0.1427 
Note. N = 254. MMR = maternal mortality ratio; SNAP = Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program; TANF = 
Temporary Assistance to Needy Families. Standard errors in parentheses. 






Results for Models Without Generosity Measures  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 MMR1 MMR2 White MMR1 White MMR2 Black MMR1 Black MMR2 
Revised 18.41*** 9.483*** 17.56*** 8.022*** 25.27*** 17.00*** 
 
(1.801) (1.111) (1.833) (1.142) (3.863) (3.094) 
















    
  
(5.562) 
    
_Cons -9.822 7.048*** -9.743 7.897*** 0.844 25.66*** 
 
(6.936) (1.217) (6.969) (0.942) (14.94) (2.471) 
Χ2 133.73*** 86.23*** 113.08*** 49.34*** 49.45*** 30.21*** 
R2 0.3001 0.2425 0.2762 0.1498 0.2100 0.1338 
Note. N = 408. BMI = body mass index; MMR = maternal mortality ratio. Standard errors in parentheses. 






Results for Models Including Only Death Certificate Revision 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
MMR1 MMR2 White MMR1 Black MMR1 
Revised 19.62*** 8.966*** 18.44*** 25.88*** 
 
(10.77) (7.54) (9.96) (6.56) 
_Cons 14.51*** 10.73*** 11.97*** 32.61*** 
 
(8.26) (10.31) (7.04) (9.65) 
Χ2 115.90*** 56.87*** 99.11*** 43.02*** 
R2 0.2492 0.1602 0.2420 0.1807 
Note. N = 408. MMR = maternal mortality ratio. Standard errors in parentheses.  







Results for Extended Maternal Mortality, Revised States Only 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
MMR MMR MMR MMR MMR 
Generosity -0.251 
    
 
(0.181) 
    
High BMI 1.697** 1.565* 1.585* 1.345* 1.668* 
 




















   
-0.191 -0.0625 
    
(0.198) (0.226) 
_Cons 3.628 -3.996 12.57 10.42 8.652 
 
(14.87) (14.66) (14.54) (20.19) (20.38) 
Χ2 8.89* 6.49* 15.29*** 7.60* 15.36** 
R2 0.1396 0.0986 0.1942 0.1217 0.1944 
Note. N = 128. BMI = body mass index; MMR = maternal mortality ratio. Standard errors in parentheses 





Results for Limited Maternal Mortality, Revised States Only 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
MMR MMR MMR MMR MMR 
Generosity -0.205* 
    
 
(0.966) 
    
Black population 21.78 22.89 15.60 16.49 20.87 
 




















   
-0.124 -0.0299 
    
(0.0945) (0.106) 
_Cons 27.55*** 21.34*** 24.07*** 24.67*** 27.50*** 
 
(4.965) (2.996) (4.19) (5.686) (5.598) 
Χ2 6.74* 4.24 4.86 3.71 7.16 
R2 0.0756 0.0524 0.0573 0.0490 0.0787 
Note. N = 128. MMR = maternal mortality ratio. Standard errors in parentheses 





Results for Extended White Maternal Mortality, Revised States Only  
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
MMR MMR MMR MMR MMR 
Generosity -0.383* 
    
 
(0.113) 
    
High BMI 1.827** 1.740** 1.650** 1.327* 1.878** 
 




















   
-0.267 0.051 
    
(0.194) (0.218) 
_Cons 4.941 -7.782 11.13 13.02 6.746 
 
(14.94) (14.90) (14.55) (20.34) (19.78) 
Χ2 12.44** 7.12* 18.60*** 8.94* 20.15*** 
R2 0.1733 0.1157 0.2109 0.1425 0.2203 
Note. N = 128. BMI = body mass index; MMR = maternal mortality ratio; SNAP = Supplemental Nutrition 
Assistance Program; TANF = Temporary Assistance to Needy Families. Standard errors in parentheses. 






Results for Limited White Maternal Mortality, Revised States Only  
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
MMR MMR MMR MMR MMR 
Generosity -0.345** 
    
 
(0.0979) 




















   
-0.221* -0.0714 
    
(0.102) (0.11) 
_Cons 34.39*** 23.76*** 27.65*** 29.41*** 34.69*** 
 
(5.144) (3.206) (4.407) (5.994) (5.772) 
Χ2 12.41*** 5.74* 6.72** 4.71* 13.25** 
R2 0.1230 0.0612 0.0705 0.0646 0.01281 
Note. N = 128. MMR = maternal mortality ratio; SNAP = Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program; TANF = 
Temporary Assistance to Needy Families. Standard errors in parentheses. 






Results for Extended Black Maternal Mortality, Revised States Only 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
MMR MMR MMR MMR MMR 
Generosity 0.965** 
    
 
(0.352) 
    
High BMI 1.161 0.875 1.625 2.949** 2.702* 
 




















   
1.068*** 0.932* 
    
(0.285) (0.396) 
_Cons -20.58 21.09 -15.08 -78.33* -72.86 
 
(29.6) (27.34) (30.31) (36.64) (38.9) 
Χ2 9.37** 4.08 7.71* 15.47*** 15.18*** 
R2 0.1441 0.0283 0.1018 0.1990 0.2000 
Note. N = 72. MMR = maternal mortality ratio; SNAP = Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program; TANF = 
Temporary Assistance to Needy Families. Standard errors in parentheses. 





Results for Limited Black Maternal Mortality, Revised States Only  
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
MMR MMR MMR MMR MMR 
Generosity 0.984*** 
    
 
(0.274) 




















   
0.628** 0.417 
    
(0.221) (0.26) 
_Cons -8.522 27.28** 13.25 6.738 -9.828 
 
(14.9) (10.4) (11.65) (13.46) (15.34) 
Χ2 12.88*** 3.01 7.58** 8.06** 14.02** 
R2 0.1846 0.0379 0.1275 0.1386 0.1948 
Note. N = 72. MMR = maternal mortality ratio; SNAP = Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program; TANF = 
Temporary Assistance to Needy Families. Standard errors in parentheses. 
* p 0 .05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Section 3.5 Discussion 
The first noteworthy result from my analysis is that the models fitted are not replicas of 
Nelson et al.’s (2018) models; many of the determinants they found to be statistically significant 
in their analysis were insignificant in my own. A possible reason for this change might stem 
from my inclusion of ICD-10 codes O96–O97, which means that deaths that are not “pregnancy-
caused” but might instead be classified as “pregnancy-associated” or “pregnancy-related” (e.g., 
overdose, homicide or suicide) are included in my mortality ratios when they are often excluded 
from traditional maternal mortality analyses despite evidence that these causes might account for 
as many deaths as traditional obstetric causes (Clark, 2012; Creanga et al., 2014; Goldman-
Mellor & Margerison, 2019). Additionally, Nelson et al. (2018) used a longer panel than my own 
(1997–2012) so that they might have found effects that my shorter panel could not. Lastly, so 
much of the variation in the MMR is attributable to the revision of the death certificate; although 
I generated a variable for each state-year regarding the proportion of their certificates that are 
revised, Nelson et al. only used a binary indicator for whether the state had adopted the revised 
certificate by 2011. 
What I found in my final models was that generosity overall was only a determinant of 
mortality for the limited mortality ratio; the same was true of SNAP. For the extended mortality 
ratio, the only safety net program with a statistically significant effect on mortality was TANF. 
The direction of the effects is as expected; increasing SNAP or TANF generosity, or increased 
generosity of the safety net package as a whole, lowers maternal mortality. In none of my models 
did Medicaid have a statistically significant effect on maternal mortality; this seems hugely 
counterintuitive, as access to publicly funded healthcare has an effect on public health beyond its 
role as part of the social safety net; see Figure 3.4 (Chung & Muntaner, 2006). The exception to 
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this is analysis carried out using state residents, rather than occurrences. In one of those models, 
Medicaid was significantly associated with a reduction in limited maternal mortality for White 
women (see Table A.3.4). 
The fact that Medicaid is almost never significantly associated with reduced mortality 
might be because its generosity is measured in the same year as the mortality ratios. So much of 
maternal mortality is dependent on the underlying health of the mother; inasmuch as underlying 
health depends on coverage and care, it depends not just on access to healthcare when pregnant 
but on access to quality healthcare throughout her life. Going forward, it might be worthwhile to 
lag measures of Medicaid in some way, to account for the generosity a woman experienced prior 
to becoming pregnant. Prior to my analysis, I hypothesized that Medicaid might be a significant 
determinant of maternal mortality in part because Medicaid is responsible for paying for the 
majority of births in this country, to say nothing of the fact that it allows low-income expectant 
mothers access to prenatal care and other obstetric services.  
However, the fact that the percentage of births financed by Medicaid does not at all 
reflect the percentage of women who are covered by the program means that there is likely 
undercoverage of the population “at risk” of becoming pregnant. Although they may gain access 
to Medicaid when pregnant or after giving birth, the underlying health status that truly 
determines mortality risk is fixed prior to this. Eliason (2020) found that Medicaid expansion 
under the ACA (2010) was associated with significantly reduced maternal mortality. As more 
women have access to health coverage before becoming pregnant, it is possible that maternal 
mortality might begin to decrease in a meaningful way.  
Another interesting finding is that, for the limited MMR, deaths whose underlying cause 
of death was coded as obstetric, while the aggregate measure of generosity was significantly 
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associated with a decrease in maternal mortality, the inclusion of each of the three programs on 
their own showed no statistical significance (Table 3.5). It is clear that the effect of aggregate 
generosity is not entirely attributable to the significance of SNAP on its own because SNAP’s 
significance disappears when the other two safety net programs are added separately. 
Additionally, the coefficient on generosity as a whole is nearly 3 times the size of the coefficient 
on SNAP alone. This result confirms not only the utility of aggregate safety net generosity as a 
measure, but also the concept of “packages” of social policies or of support (Meyers et al., 2001). 
The whole of the social safety net is more than the sum of its parts, in this case, generosity is 
more than the individual effects of the three programs explored.  
The effect of generosity is dwarfed by the effects of the determinants included in the 
baseline model. Together, the proportion of births to Black women and the proportion of death 
certificates issues that are the 2003 revision account for 24% of the variation in the limited MMR 
(see Table 3.10); the addition of aggregate generosity explains only an additional 2%. Although 
generosity is statistically significant, the policy significance is seemingly quite small. However, 
similar to the way in which the combination of the three programs explored here exacerbated 
their individual effect, it is possible that the addition of other safety net programs not accounted 
for in the index could have an even greater effect. The most likely program to have an effect in 
this way is WIC, which, although it is not included in the index because of a lack of variation, 
could be considered in analyses that focus on a particular state or a particular time instead of 
exploiting a panel.  
In the results for extended maternal mortality I found that TANF is the only program of 
statistical significance, whether it is combined with other safety net programs (see Table 3.5). 
Unlike the case of limited mortality, aggregate generosity is not significant and TANF remains 
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significant on its own even when entered into the model in combination with the other two 
programs. TANF on its own explains an additional 2% of the variation in extended MMR from 
the baseline model. A likely reason that TANF affects only extended, rather than limited MMR, 
is that extended MMR is likely to be picking up more “pregnancy-associated” or “pregnancy-
related” deaths relative to limited MMR, which is much more likely to detect “pregnancy-
caused” deaths. The former are more likely to occur after labor and delivery relative to the latter. 
TANF is only available to households with children (although some states do allow women 
expecting their first child at various points in their pregnancy); therefore, I would speculate that 
its protective effect comes after discharge from the hospital or birthing facility and so is less 
likely to protect against more proximate obstetric causes of mortality.  
I chose to focus on the Black–White differential because it is of significant public 
concern, ranking very high on the public’s agenda. Although MMR for American Indian/Alaska 
Native women is also extremely high compared to White MMR, the numbers are so small and 
concentrated in so few states that the analysis at the state level would be extremely limited. The 
MMR for Hispanic women (of all races) is on the whole lower than for non-Hispanic White 
women, however the range is much wider, with a maximum expanded MMR of 477 deaths per 
100,000 live births, whereas the maximum expanded MMR for White women is less than 100 
(see Table 3.4). Although I do not explore the Hispanic MMR and therefore, do not discuss 
reasons for this large variance, much room remains for future analysis of states in which MMRs 
for Hispanic women are much higher than they are for White women, in contrast to the national 
trend, and the reasons for it. 
In looking at the results of the race-stratified analysis, it is clear that Black maternal 
mortality is inherently different. Although White maternal mortality reflects the results seen in 
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total mortality, Black MMRs show no effect of the generosity of the safety net despite earlier 
findings that lower income inequality and expansion of Medicaid are associated with improved 
Black maternal mortality relative to White women (Eliason, 2020; Vilda et al., 2019). It is clear 
that the “traditional” risk factors for mortality that Nelson et al. explored cannot explain Black 
maternal mortality in the way that they can total mortality. Even if those risk factors have 
explanatory powers at the individual level, when one looks at Black maternal mortality ratios as 
a whole, there is clearly more determining the rates than has been studied to date. Going forward, 
unique sources of stress for Black women need to be identified and ideally quantified for 
inclusion in analysis. Only by targeting the factors that uniquely affect Black mothers is it 
possible to reduce the enormous racial disparity in maternal deaths.  
Looking at the results for only the states that used the revised death certificate throughout 
the entire period, the results change primarily for the race-stratified analyses. Although the 
ameliorative effect of safety net generosity on mortality is even more significant for White 
women, Black mothers show strongly significant negative effects of safety net generosity on 
maternal mortality; as generosity increases, so too does Black maternal mortality. Although the 
major reduction in the number of observations used is obviously problematic, especially when 
looking at Black MMRs, this result further confirms that the nature of Black maternal mortality 
is fundamentally different from White maternal mortality, and this distinction should be explored 
further. 
The most important thing to consider, in looking at the results that show no major 
ameliorative effect of generosity on maternal mortality, is what the metric of generosity is 
actually measuring. The results of these analyses should not be seen to prove that increasing 
assistance through programs similar to Medicaid will not have a positive effect on maternal 
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mortality: researchers know that is not true, that expanding these programs can improve maternal 
birth outcomes. What my generosity score actually measures is the statutory and regulatory 
hurdles to accessing assistance. Rather than interpreting the results to mean that increasing this 
access does not have an entirely positive effect on MMRs, it is instead possible that the 
previously demonstrated impact of these programs occurs because of something besides their 
regulations and procedures. My measure does not contain indicators of how many people receive 
assistance, how much assistance they typically receive, and what form that assistance takes.  
Therefore, it would perhaps be more accurate, to describe the index as a measure of the 
accessibility of the safety net, rather than its generosity. Medicaid accessibility is not 
significantly associated with a reduction in maternal mortality, which means that other facets of 
the program are significantly associated. Medicaid expansion, following the ACA (2010), has 
demonstrated marked improvements in maternal mortality, especially for Black women; 
nevertheless, the index does not demonstrate a similar effect; therefore, a piece is missing in this 
index (Eliason, 2020). Going forward, it behooves researchers to examine specifically what parts 
of increased “generosity” are responsible for the improved outcomes: Is it the provision of 
resources or services? Is it eligibility criteria? Perhaps, future analysists should look at the 
subindices and their individual effects on MMRs.  
Although the purpose of creating the index was to generate a parsimonious measure of 
the safety net, a single generosity figure precludes me from knowing what is most directly 
responsible for MMR reductions. However, my results also show that breaking the safety net 
apart into its component pieces does not demonstrate the same effect as the combination of the 
programs. I would propose, going forward, that program subindices for various characteristics of 
the programs be combined into characteristic subindices that contain all three programs. In this 
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way, it would be possible to examine whether eligibility criteria for all three programs might 
contribute to reduced mortality, or to examine the administrative regulations, rather than looking 
at all aspects of the programs at once.  
Additionally, if the index is in fact measuring accessibility rather than generosity, the 
benefits of easier access might accrue to those who are relatively better off regarding their social 
capital or experiences with bureaucracy. Again, the index is a measure of the rules as they are 
written, not as they are enforced. If eligibility is extended or requirements eliminated, it is 
unlikely that the average citizen and most importantly someone already fighting the stresses of 
poverty would know about these changes or how to take advantage of them, which means that 
the benefits of the increased accessibility accrue to the potential recipients who are relatively 
socially advantaged. In the United States, those benefits are then likelier to accrue to White 
women, while Black women are likely to remain at a disadvantage. 
Although Black maternal mortality that seems to increase with the accessibility or 
generosity of the safety net is extremely concerning, I do not understand it to mean that 
increasing access to the programs actually has a negative impact on Black maternal health. 
Rather, clearly important variables are omitted from my analysis. Although my selection of 
control variables was inspired by prior research, too much of that research has focused on 
individual-level determinants of mortality, even if those individual determinants were measured 
at the state level. For example, Nelson et al. (2018) claimed to focus on state-level factors, but 
many of their explanatory variables are actually measures of how common the individual-level 
risk factors are in a given state. Although these factors are important, they are not truly reaching 
the social determinants of maternal health.  
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In fact, examining the effect of generosity or accessibility of the safety net without other 
indicators that truly measure the social and policy determinants of maternal mortality is possible, 
but is also incomplete. The next steps are to continue searching for the social factors and to 
include them in the analysis, examining factors like income inequality and measures of racial 
equality, which Vilda et al. (2019) have demonstrated are associated with maternal mortality.  
Conclusion 
The relatively high rate of maternal death in the United States is largely socially 
determined. Although analyses to date have focused on individuals and analyzing individual 
level data, they have clearly identified risk factors that are known to be the result of 
socioeconomic status, societal organization, and the public provision of social and health 
assistance in addition to individual and clinical factors. However, attempts to determine the 
relative influence of those social determinants on aggregate rates has been seriously lacking to 
date. The few analyses using state-level data have largely failed to isolate the effect of public 
social policy.  
The analysis carried out in this paper uniquely highlights the role of the social safety net 
in ameliorating the abysmal maternal death rates in the United States. Notably, it identifies the 
combination of social programs into a package of support as offering a protective effect beyond 
any individual program effect. Yet one of the most concerning features of the maternal mortality 
crisis is its enormous racial gap, and yet I find no evidence that these policies affect Black 
mothers the way they seem to affect White mothers. Although the generosity index is a 
worthwhile measure of how wide the social safety net is cast, for Black women there is a 
fundamental disconnect from the supportive effects of that net.  
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As the maternal health crisis continues to climb the policy agenda—gaining more 
attention and action from legislators, clinicians, public health experts and the public—it will be 
necessary to refine any generosity measure so that it accurately reflects the experiences of all 
Americans. As discussed in the first paper, the welfare rules database (Urban Institute, n.d.) used 
in these papers only included formal policies and decisions as written by state and federal 
agencies. The database (and consequently the generosity index) cannot account for how the 
individuals responsible actually administer these programs. Black Americans experience a 
different daily reality from most other Americans; therefore, one can expect that they also 
experience a different system of public support or the social safety net. Future analysis needs to 
be guided by the acknowledgement of this dual society and by attempt to include information 
from both groups of Americas: Americans whose experience is felt by most individuals, and 
Americans whose experience is felt by Black individuals.  
Going forward, I hope that researchers can finally disentangle the variation in mortality 
ratios from the variation in the sensitivity of measurement. The enormous effect of the 2003 
revision to death certificates will ideally disappear now that all states have adopted the revised 
version. The growing calls for MMRCs, as well, will help to identify sensitively and accurately 
maternal deaths. When accurate MMRs exist for all states, the exploration of population-level 
factors and policy decisions will allow a more nuanced understanding of the social determinants 






The three papers that comprise this manuscript represent my attempt to examine the role 
of safety net generosity on a public health outcome of grave concern, the maternal mortality rate 
in the United States. The initial impetus was to find a way of establishing a quantitative measure 
of social assistance across states and time. In the first paper, I explain the process whereby 
assistance programs were selected and how their rules were then quantified. In the second paper, 
I then address how to combine program features into a single measure, using those quantified 
rules from the first paper to create a simple index by averaging together the scores for each state 
in each year. Although I attempted a factor analysis, my hypothesized models failed to explain 
adequately the data patterns. Finally, in the third paper, I demonstrate how the index might be 
used in public health analysis by incorporating the generosity index into state-level analysis of 
maternal mortality.  
What is unique about this combination of papers is that I attempt to bridge the gap 
between public health and policy analysis. Although the first two papers fall very much in the 
tradition of political science or sociology to use different techniques to combine data in novel 
ways and create unique measures, the third paper is a very traditional public health analysis of 
state-level factors associated with maternal mortality. The latter category of research too often 
uses only direct measures of relevant factors. Even researchers who have examined the social 
determinants of population health have used indicators of social factors that are not constructed, 
but are observable. However, in as the fields of education, psychology, and political science,  
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researchers frequently construct more sophisticated indicators to illuminate an underlying 
concept.  
The three papers contained in this manuscript borrow from both traditions, first because I 
constructed a generosity measure, and second because I used it in a broader analysis. Although 
the current best measure of generosity is the naïve index, obtained by averaging all observed 
indicators, going forward, I hope that it will be possible to refine this measure by using the 
additional technique of weighting the observed indicators by their relative theoretical 
importance. I also hope that my use of a constructed measure of a latent characteristic (e.g., 
“generosity” or “accessibility” of the social safety net in a public health analysis) will not remain 
a rare instance of public health and policy research using constructed indicators, and that other 
researchers will seek to operationalize latent characteristics for use in their analyses.  
In addition to bridging the divide between methodological social science and health 
policy analysis, in my third paper, I fill a large gap in the literature on maternal mortality in the 
United States. However, even as the maternal health crisis gains national and international 
attention, sparking increased research on the topic, scholars have focused almost exclusively on 
individual-level and facility-level analyses. Very few studies have used population-wide, state-
level factors to examine maternal health. How can Americans solve a problem affecting their 
entire society without first understanding the society-wide factors that influence it?  
The final major contribution of these papers is that I found that, regarding the social 
safety net, the whole is greater than the sum of its parts. Although the piecemeal inclusion of the 
three safety net programs that I used in my analysis demonstrated limited or no effect on 
maternal mortality, the combination of the three programs into an index does appear to have an 
effect. This finding demonstrates the value of the work performed in Papers 1 and 2; although 
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traditional models might include the programs as individual measures, the combination of 
programs that I generated in the first two papers showed the actual effect on the outcome. By 
carrying out the analysis in Paper 3 using the index generated in Papers 1 and 2, I was able to 
observe an effect that would otherwise have been missed.  
This result also indicates valuable value regarding the safety net itself. Social assistance 
and its effect on maternal health can be understood as the proverbial three-legged stool: when 
one piece or program is taken away, the stool or the buffer of social assistance falls, or fails to 
support people as intended. This has important policy implications, for shrinking one aspect of 
social assistance is also akin to severing or removing a strand from the fabric of the social safety 
net: many more people are going to fall through the holes in the fabric. Even if the target 
program or policy seems unrelated to an outcome of interest, it remains necessary for the other 
policies or programs—that do theoretically relate to that outcome—to have an effect.  
Ultimately, I imagine that additional filaments make up the social safety net and that, 
when they are combined with the programs in my index, they could have an even greater 
combined impact. Performing an analysis using the measures of these supports on their own 
might fail to yield an observed effect in the same way that a single strand of fiber cannot support 
a person. Furthermore, even multiple supports or strands might allow people to fall through the 
fabric if the net is woven too loosely; therefore, it is only by weaving numerous strands into a 
durable net that people can truly be supported. If the generated construct of latent generosity is 
the safety net, then one hopes that adding additional forms of social support to that measure in 
the future will provide a more robust observed effect of that support. These three papers are only 
the beginning, but I hope that this idea of the safety net as a metaphorical physical net—that only 
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works well when all of its strands are woven well—is incorporated into future research on social 
assistance.   
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APPENDIX 1: FACTOR ANALYSIS VARIABLE LIST 
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) 
Data regarding the food stamp program come from the SNAP Policy Database (USDA, ERS, 
n.d.). The database contains observations from all 50 states and Washington, D.C. for the years 
1996–2016. Observations are recorded monthly.  
FS01 / SNAP_bbce: a categorical variable indicating whether a state allows broad-based 
categorical eligibility (BBCE). As data is collapsed to generate a year from 12 months of 
observations, this variable can detect years in which BBCE was allowed in some months 
but not in others. This variable takes on a value of 2 if the state allowed BBCE for the 
entire year (n = 367), a value of 1 if BBCE was allowed in only part of the year (n = 39), 
and it takes on a value of 0 if the state did not allow BBCE at all during the year  
(n = 665). 
FS02 / SNAP_cap: a categorical variable indicating whether a state operates a combined 
application project (CAP). As data is collapsed to generate a year from 12 months of 
observations, this variable can detect years in which CAP was allowed in some months 
but not in others. This variable takes on a value of 2 if the state operated CAP for the 
entire year (n = 189), a value of 1 if CAP was in use for only part of the year (n = 18), 
and it takes on a value of 0 if the state did not operate CAP at all during the year  
(n = 864).  
FS03 / SNAP_ebtissuance: a continuous variable indicating the proportion of a state’s SNAP 
expenditures that were spent using Electronic Benefit Transfer. This variable takes the 
proportion of state SNAP benefits accounted for by EBT in each month and finds the 
average of this figure for all 12 months.  
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FS04 / SNAP_faceini: a categorical variable indicating whether a state has been granted a waiver 
to use telephone interviews instead of face-to-face interviews at initial certification in at 
least part of the state. This variable takes on a value of 0 if the state had not been granted 
a waiver (n = 698), a value of 1 if a state had this waiver for some but not all of the year 
(n = 52) and a value of 2 if the state had this waiver in place for the entire year (n = 321).  
FS05 / SNAP_facerec: a categorical variable indicating whether a state has been granted a 
waiver to use telephone interviews instead of face-to-face interviews at recertification in 
at least part of the state. This variable takes on a value of 0 if the state had not been 
granted a waiver (n = 614), a value of 1 if a state had this waiver for some but not all of 
the year (n = 50) and a value of 2 if the state had this waiver in place for the entire year  
(n = 407). 
FS06 / SNAP_reportsimple: a categorical variable indicating whether a state uses the simplified 
reporting option for houses with earnings. This variable takes on a value of 0 if the state 
does not use simplified reporting (n = 377), a value of 1 if a state uses it for some but not 
all of the year (n = 46) and a value of 2 if the state uses it for the entire year (n = 648).  
FS07 / SNAP_vehicle: a categorical variable indicating to what degree the state excludes 
vehicles from the asset limit. This variable takes on a value of 2 if the state excludes all 
vehicles from the asset test (n = 442). It takes on a value of 1 if the state exempts at least 
one but not all of the vehicles in a household from the asset test (under both traditional 
and BBCE), or if it exempts a value greater than the SNAP standard exemption from the 
fair market value of a vehicle for counting in the asset test (n = 255). It takes on a value 
of 0 if it does not exempt one or all vehicles (n = 374). Currently the values range from 
0–2 because of the data collapse over the year. Data was not available for 2016, so the 
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assumption was made that no change occurred since 2015, and the value remains the 
same.  
FS08 / SNAP_noncit: a continuous variable indicating the coverage of noncitizens who are 
permitted assistance under federal law. This variable is created by finding the average of 
the monthly observations of three categorical variables measuring whether there is full or 
partial coverage of allowed noncitizen adults, noncitizen children and noncitizen elderly 
individuals. These three values were then averaged to find a variable ranging from 0–2 
that provides some indication of a state-year’s coverage of noncitizens.  
FS09 / SNAP_certavg: a continuous variable that measures the length of the average certification 
period in months, where approximately 5.5 is the shortest period and the longest period is 
almost 25.5 months. These data are generated by taking the average certification period 
in months for earning, nonearning and elderly households. This value is then collapsed 
from 12 months to one yearly observation. A longer certification period indicates more 
generosity as it means the household has to recertify their eligibility less often.  
FS10 / SNAP_call_centers: a categorical variable indicating whether the state operates call 
centers. This variable takes on a value of 2 if the state operated call centers state-wide for 
the entire year (n = 236). It takes on a value of 1 if it operated call centers in some parts 
of the state or for some part of the year (either statewide or in part of the state; indicates 
partial coverage) (n = 180). It takes on a value of 0 if the state did not operate any call 
centers (n = 655).  
FS11 / SNAP_finterprint:  a categorical variable indicating whether the state requires finger-
printing of applicants. This variable takes on a value of 0 if the state required finger-
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printing in any part of the state at any time during that year (n = 77), and a value of 1 if 
the state did not require finger-printing at all (n = 994). 
FS12 / SNAP_online: a categorical variable indicating whether the state allows online 
applications. This variable takes on a value of 2 if the state allowed online applications 
across the entire state for the entire year (n = 312). It takes on a value of 1 if it allowed 
online applications in some parts of the state or for some part of the year (either statewide 
or in part of the state; indicates partial coverage) (n = 66). It takes on a value of 0 if the 
state did not allow online applications (n = 693). 
FS13 / SNAP_outreach: a binary variable indicating whether the state spent any money in a year 
(whether that money comes from the state, federal government or a grant) on outreach. 
This variable takes on a value of 1 if the state spent any money that year (n = 635) and 
takes on a value of 0 if the state had no outreach spending (n = 436).  
FS14 / SNAP_transition: a categorical variable indicating whether the state offers transitional 
benefits to those leaving SNAP. This variable takes on a value of 2 if the state offered 
transitional benefits for the entire year (n = 236), a value of 1 if the state offered them for 
part of the year (n = 26), and a value of 0 if it did not offer them at all (n = 809). 
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) 
Data on state TANF policies come from the Urban Institute’s (n.d.). Welfare Rules Database, 
which contains information on TANF policies in all 50 states and Washington, D.C. for the years 
1999–2016 and are recorded based on the state’s TANF policy manual for that year. In states 
where policies can vary even within the state, the policy that is used for most of the state or in 
the most populous jurisdiction is recorded.  
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TANFD1 / TANF_divert_1: a binary program indicating whether a state has a diversion 
program. This variable takes on a value of 0 if the state does have a diversion program  
(n = 557) and a value of 1 if it does not have a diversion program (n = 361). The 
existence of a diversion program is thought to be an indicator of less generosity because 
it is intended to keep people off of the welfare rolls.  
TANFD3 / TANF_divert_3: a categorical variable indicating what forms diversion payments 
take, if the state does have a diversion program. This variable takes on a value of 0 if the 
diversion payment is a cash loan that must be paid back (n = 36). It has a value of 1 if 
diversion assistance is only rendered through support services (n = 1), a value of 2 if it 
consists of support services and vendor payments but does not include cash (n = 62), a 
value of 3 if it gives support services, vendor payments and allows for the possibility of 
cash assistance (n = 155), and it takes on a value of 4 if diversion assistance is given as a 
cash payment, although this can include vendor payments as well (n = 302).  
TANFD5 / TANF_divert_5: a binary variable that indicates whether, in states that have a 
diversion program, there exists a time period after diversion during which the unit is 
ineligible for further TANF assistance. This variable takes on a value of 1 if there is no 
period of ineligibility (n = 116) and a value of 0 if there is such a period (n = 278).  
TANFD6 / TANF_divert_6: a categorical variable indicating whether receipt of diversion 
assistance counts towards the lifetime limit. This variable takes on a value of 2 if the time 
does not count (n = 463), 1 if it varies (n = 35), or 0 if it does count (n = 56).  
TANFJS / TANF_jobsearch: a binary variable indicating whether the state requires a job search 
upon application. This variable takes on a value of 0 if the states requires a job search (n 
= 332) and a value of 1 if no job search is required (n = 584).  
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TANFPREG / TANF_pregnant: a categorical variable that indicates in which trimester of 
pregnancy, if any, a woman with no other children becomes eligible for assistance. This 
variable takes on the value of 0 if pregnant women with no other children are never 
eligible, 1 if they are eligible in the 3rd trimester (n = 200), 2 if eligible in the 2nd 
trimester (n = 209) and 3 if eligible in the 1st trimester or upon verification of the 
pregnancy (n = 169).  
TANFTEEN / TANF_teenhead_1: a binary variable that indicates whether teenagers can ever be 
considered unit heads. PRWORA mandated that states cannot provide assistance to teen 
parents not living with a parent or guardian unless they meet certain characteristics that 
would make doing so impossible/against their interest (Saxon, 1997). This variable takes 
on a value of 0 if teens cannot be considered unit heads (n = 178) or 1 if they can be unit 
heads (n = 733).  
TANFA1 / TANF_asset_1: a categorical variable indicating what the initial asset limit is for 
applicants. This variable takes on a value of 1 for asset limits up to $1000 (n = 181), a 
value of 2 for limits above $1000 and up to $2000 (n = 397), a value of 3 for limits above 
$2000 up to $3000 (n = 198), a value of 4 for limits above $3000 and up to $6000  
(n = 61) and a value of 5 for a limit above $6000 or in cases where the asset test has been 
eliminated (n = 75).  
TANFINC1 / TANF_income_1: a categorical variable indicating the initial income eligibility 
limit for applicants. This variable takes on a value of 1 for income limits up to $500  
(n = 202), a value of 2 for limits above $500 up to $1000 (n = 480), a value of 3 for limits 
above $1000 and up to $1500 (n = 188) and a value of 4 for income limits greater than 
$1500 (n = 34).  
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TANFBN5 / TANF_benefit_5: a categorical variable indicating the statutory maximum benefit 
for a family of three. This variable only has 177 observations, likely to be eliminated 
from the dataset. 
TANFBN6 / TANF_benefit_6: a categorical variable indicating the maximum monthly benefits 
for a family of three. This variable takes on a value of 1 for benefits up to $200 (n = 39), 
a value of 2 for benefits above $200 and up to $300 (n = 203), a value of 3 for benefits 
above $300 and up to $400 (n = 183) , a value of 4 for benefits above $400 and up to 
$600 (n = 352), and a value of 5 for benefits greater than $600 (n = 83).  
TANFBV1 / TANF_behavior_1: a binary variable indicating whether the state requires school 
attendance from children receiving assistance. This variable takes on a value of 0 if there 
are school requirements (n = 623) and a value of 1 if there are no school requirements  
(n = 294).  
TANFBV2 / TANF_behavior_2: a binary variable indicating whether the state has school 
bonuses. This variable takes on a value of 0 for states that do provide school bonuses (n = 
148) and a value of 1 if they do not (n = 769). Despite offering a “bonus” we decided to 
code those states that offer this incentive as less generous because it still represents a 
condition/incentive for recipients to meet in order to “unlock” particular levels of 
assistance. The more generous condition is actually to provide unconditional assistance.  
TANFBV3 / TANF_behavior_3: a binary variable indicating whether the state has immunization 
requirements. This variable takes on a value of 0 if there are immunization requirements 
(n = 466) and a value of 1 if there are not immunization requirements (n = 451).  
TANFBV4 / TANF_behavior_4: a binary variable indicating whether the state has health 
screening requirements. This variable takes on a value of 0 if there are health screening 
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requirements (n = 126) and a value of 1 if there are not health screening requirements  
(n = 791).  
TANFBV5 / TANF_behavior_5: a binary variable indicating whether the state has other 
requirements. This variable takes on a value of 0 if there are other requirements (n = 11) 
and a value of 1 if there are no other requirements (n = 498). 
TANFBV0 / TANF_behavior_0: a categorical variable indicating how many conditions a state 
puts on recipients. This variable takes on a value of 0 if there are five or more conditions 
(n = 121), a value of 1 if there are four conditions (n = 218), a value of 2 if there are 
three conditions (n = 272), a value of 3 if there are two conditions (n = 218), a value of 4 
if there is only one condition (n = 74) and a value of 5 if there are no conditions or 
incentives (n = 15).  
TANFWX1 / TANF_workex_1: a continuous variable that indicates how many hours a single-
unit head must work in an uncompensated job to be exempted from work requirements. 
This variable was generated by subtracting the number of hours from 50, so that as the 
number of hours needed to be worked for an exemption increased, this variable score 
decreases. The exception is scores of zero, which remained as such, because they 
represent states that do not exempt unit heads who work in uncompensated jobs from 
work requirements.  
TANFWX2 / TANF_workex_2: a binary variable that indicates whether a state exempts a single-
unit head who is ill or incapacitated from work requirements. This variable takes on a 
value of 0 if unit heads are not exempted for illness/incapacity (n = 320) and a value of 1 
if they are exempted (n = 526).  
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TANFWX3 / TANF_workex_3: a binary variable that indicates whether a state exempts a single-
unit head who is caring for someone ill or incapacitated from work requirements. This 
variable takes on a value of 0 if unit heads are not exempted (n = 212) and a value of 1 if 
they are exempted (n = 634). 
TANFWX4 / TANF_workex_4: a binary variable indicating whether a state exempts single-unit 
heads who are above a certain age from work requirements. This variable takes on a 
value of 1 if the state does exempt unit heads who are above a certain age threshold  
(n = 526) and 0 if it does not (n = 392).  
TANFWX5 / TANF_workex_5: a categorical variable indicating the month in which a pregnant 
single-unit head can be exempted from work requirements. This variable takes on a value 
of 0 if the pregnant unit head is never exempt (n = 616), a value of 1 if they are exempt in 
the 3rd trimester (n = 149), a value of 2 if they are exempt in the 2nd trimester (n = 62) 
and a value of 3 if they are exempt in the 1st trimester or upon verification of the 
pregnancy (n = 13).  
TANFWX6 / TANF_workex_6: a continuous variable indicating the maximum age in months of 
a child for whose care a single-unit head is exempted from work requirements.  
TANFWX0 / TANF_workex_0: a categorical variable indicating how many exemptions the state 
has from the work requirements for the single head of an assistance unit, ranging from no 
exemptions to 6 exemptions. 
TANFWR1 / TANF_workreq_1: a categorical variable indicating when a single-unit head must 
begin participation in the work requirements. This variable takes on a value of 0 if they 
must begin immediately upon application (n = 621), a value of 1 if they must begin after 
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their assessment (n = 47), a value of 2 if they must begin within three months (n = 39) 
and a value of 3 if they must begin within two years (n = 54).  
TANFSC3 / TANF_sanction_3: a categorical variable indicating the most severe sanction 
possible for failure to comply with requirements. This variable takes on a value of 0 if the 
penalty is closure of the entire case (n = 278), a value of 1 if the unit loses their entire 
benefit (n = 403) and a value of 2 if the unit loses only the adult portion of the benefit  
(n = 119).  
TANF2PAR / TANF_two-parent: a categorical variable indicating whether two-parent 
households are eligible for assistance. This variable takes on a value of 0 if they are never 
eligible (n = 29), 1 if they are eligible but with restrictions (n = 200), and 2 if they are 
eligible without restrictions (n = 688).  
TANFA4 / TANF_asset_4: a categorical variable indicating the asset limit for recipients 
(different from initial applicants). This variable takes on a value of 1 if the recipient asset 
limit is anything up to $2000 (n = 143), a value of 2 if the recipient asset limit is $2000 or 
greater, up to $3000 (n = 455), a value of 3 if the limit is $3000 or greater, up to $4000  
(n = 125), a value of 4 if the limit is $4000 or greater, up to $6000 (n = 94), and a value 
of 5 if the asset limit is $6000 or higher, or the recipient asset limit has been eliminated  
(n = 78).  
TANFF1 / TANF_family_1: a binary variable indicating whether a state has a family cap policy 
(does not increase TANF payments with the birth of an additional child while on TANF). 
This variable takes on a value of 0 if the state does implement a family cap (n = 343), and 
a value of 1 if they do not have this policy (n = 574).  
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TANFL1 / TANF_limit_1: a binary variable indicating how long the state’s lifetime limit is. This 
variable takes on a value of 0 if the limit is less than 60 months (n = 169), and a value of 
1 if the limit is 60 months or greater (n = 580). There seems to be a problem with this 
variable, review.  
TANFL2 / TANF_limit_2: a binary variable indicating whose benefits are terminated once the 
lifetime limit is reached. This variable takes on a value of 0 if benefits are terminated for 
the entire unit (n = 783) and a value of 1 if only the adult portion of the benefits are 
terminated (n = 60).  
TANFL3 / TANF_limit_3: a binary variable indicating whether the state has spell limits. Spell 
limits constrain the number of consecutive months a unit can receive assistance. This 
limit will be shorter than the lifetime limit, and require a period of months without 
assistance before the unit can reapply (assuming they have not maxed out their lifetime 
limit). This variable takes on a value of 0 if there are spell limits (n = 645), and a value of 
1 if the state does not have these limits (n = 124).  
TANFIM2 / TANF_immigrant_2: This variable seems to present a problem.  
TANFIM0 / TANF_immigrant_0: a binary variable indicating whether the state provides 
assistance to authorized immigrants beyond what is required by PRWORA. This variable 
takes on a value of 0 if the state does not provide additional assistance (n = 462), and a 
value of 1 if they provide more assistance than required (n = 456).  
TANFA2 / TANF_asset_2: a binary variable indicating whether the applicant asset limit is 
higher for households that contain an elderly and/or disabled member. This variable takes 
on a value of 0 if the initial asset limit for applicants is not increased for units with 
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elderly and/or disabled members (n = 778) and a value of 1 if the limit is higher  
(n = 135).  
TANFA5 / TANF_asset_5: binary variable indicating whether the recipient asset limit is higher 
for households that contain an elderly and/or disabled member. This variable takes on a 
value of 0 if the asset limit for recipients is not increased for units with elderly and/or 
disabled members (n = 761) and a value of 1 if the limit is higher (n = 135).  
MEDICAID 
Data on Medicaid comes from the Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation and the Urban Institute. 
Medicaid data is available for all 50 states and Washington, D.C.  for the years 2001–2016.    
MCEL01 / WG_Medicaid_Eligibility_01: a continuous variable indicating the income eligibility 
level for children under the age of one as a proportion of the federal poverty line (FPL). 
This variable ranges from 1.33–4 (indicating eligibility thresholds ranging from 133% 
FPL to 400% FPL).  
MCEL02 / WG_Medicaid_Eligibility_02: a continuous variable indicating the income eligibility 
level for children between the ages of one and five as a proportion of FPL. This variable 
ranges from 1.33–4.  
MCEL03 / WG_Medicaid_Eligibility_03: a continuous variable indicating the income eligibility 
level for children between the ages of 6 and 18 years. This variable ranges from 1–4.  
MCEL04 / WG_Medicaid_Eligibility_04: a continuous variable indicating the income eligibility 
level for pregnant women. This variable ranges from 1.33–3.8.  
MCEL05 / WG_Medicaid_Eligibility_05: a continuous variable indicating the income eligibility 
level for parents. This variable ranges from 0.16–2.75.  
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MCEL06 / WG_Medicaid_Eligibility_06: a continuous variable indicating the income eligibility 
level for adults without dependents. This variable ranges from 0 for states that do not 
allow these adults to be eligible for Medicaid, to a maximum of 2.55.   
MCAD01 / WG_Medicaid_Admin_01: a continuous variable indicating the average wait length 
for enrollment.  
MCAD02 / WG_Medicaid_Admin_02: a categorical variable indicating whether a state requires 
a face-to-face interview for enrollment for children. For states with a “state separate 
program” (SSP), meaning they operate a CHIP program separate from their Medicaid 
program, the value is an average of the two programs.  
MCAD03 / WG_Medicaid_Admin_03: a categorical variable indicating whether a state requires 
a face-to-face interview for parents. This variable takes on a value of 0 if the state 
continues to require face-to-face interviews for parents (n = 154) and a value of 1 if they 
have eliminated this requirement (n = 756).  
MCAD04 / WG_Medicaid_Admin_04: a categorical variable indicating whether a state has 
eliminated the asset test for all participants. This variable takes on a value of 0 if the state 
maintains the asset test for all participants (n = 24), a value of 1 if they’ve partially 
eliminated it (n = 55), and a value of 2 if they have eliminated the asset test (n = 839).  
MCAD05 / WG_Medicaid_Admin_05: a categorical variable indicating whether the state has 
eliminated the asset test for parents. This variable takes on a value of 0 if the state 
maintains an asset test for parents (n = 354), a value of 1 if either the state separate 
program (SSP) or the traditional Medicaid program has eliminated the test but not both (n 
= 71), and a value of 2 if the state has eliminated the asset test for parents (n = 493).  
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MCAD06 / WG_Medicaid_Admin_06: a categorical variable indicating whether the state allows 
for presumptive eligibility in their Medicaid or SSP program. Presumptive eligibility 
allows for certain individuals, as identified by qualified entities, to begin receiving 
services before their application is processed Medicaid (n.d.). This variable takes on a 
value of 0 if the state does not allow presumptive eligibility (n = 664), a value of 1 if 
either the SSP or the traditional Medicaid program allows for presumptive eligibility  
(n = 60), and a value of 2 if the state allows for presumptive eligibility (n = 194).  
MCAD07 / WG_Medicaid_Admin_07: a binary variable indicating whether pregnant women 
who are otherwise ineligible are eligible for Medicaid. This variable takes on a value of 0 
if the state does not provide coverage for otherwise ineligible pregnant women (n = 378) 
and a value of 1 if the state does provide such coverage (n = 540).  
MCAD08 / WG_Medicaid_Admin_08: a categorical variable indicating whether the state has 
continuous eligibility for SSP or Medicaid. Continuous eligibility allows a family to 
continue receiving Medicaid or SSP coverage for 12 months even if the family’s income 
changes during that year to exceed the eligibility threshold Medicaid (n.d.). This variable 
takes on a value of 0 if the state does not allow continuous eligibility (n = 359), a value of 
1 if the state allows continuous eligibility for either SSP or Medicaid program (n = 210), 
and a value of 2 if the state allows continuous eligibility (n = 349).  
MCAD09 / WG_Medicaid_Admin_09: a categorical variable indicating whether the state has 
eliminated face-to-face interviews for all enrollees to renew their enrollment in the 
program. This variable takes on a value of 0 if the state continues to require face-to-face 
interviews (n = 21), a value of 1 if this requirement was eliminated for SSP or Medicaid 
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but not both (n = 17), and a value of 2 if the interview requirement has been eliminated  
(n = 880).  
MCAD10 / WG_Medicaid_Admin_10: a categorical variable indicating whether the state has 
eliminated face-to-face interviews for parents to renew their enrollment in the program. 
This variable takes on a value of 0 if the state continues to require face-to-face interviews 
(n = 105), a value of 1 if this requirement was eliminated for a SSP or Medicaid but not 
both (n = 13), and a value of 2 if the interview requirement has been eliminated  
(n = 800).   
MCAD11 / WG_Medicaid_Admin_11: a variable indicating renewal frequency for all 
participants. This variable can take on a value of 6 (n = 43), 6.5 (n = 9), 7.5 (n = 1), 9  
(n = 50), 10.5 (n = 1) or 12 (n = 814).  
MCAD12 / WG_Medicaid_Admin_12: a variable indicating renewal frequency for parents. This 
variable can take on a value of 0.96 (n = 9), 3 (n = 11), 6 (n = 102), 9 (n = 38), or 12  
(n = 758).  
MCIM01 / WG_Medicaid_Immigrant_01: a binary variable indicating whether the state provides 
coverage to lawfully present immigrant children prior to the expiration of the 5-year 
waiting period, as allowed under the CHIP legislation (Medicaid, n.d.). This variable 
takes on a value of 0 if immigrant children do not receive coverage during the 5-year ban 
(n = 499) and a value of 1 if the state does provide coverage (n = 368).  
MCIM02 / WG_Medicaid_Immigrant_02: a binary variable indicating whether the state provides 
coverage to children in the country unlawfully. This variable takes on a value of 0 if 
unauthorized immigrant children are ineligible (n = 783) and a value of 1 if they are 
eligible (n = 84).  
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MCIM03 / WG_Medicaid_Immigrant_03: a binary variable indicating whether a state provides 
coverage to legal permanent residents (LPRs) during the 5-year ineligibility period. This 
variable takes on a value of 0 if the state does not provide LPRs with this coverage  
(n = 711) and a value of 1 if LPRs are covered during this time (n = 156).  
MCIM04 / WG_Medicaid_Immigrant_04: a binary variable indicating whether the state provides 
coverage to adults in the country unlawfully. This variable takes on a value of 0 if 
unauthorized immigrant adults are ineligible (n = 851) and a value of 1 if they are eligible 
(n = 16).  
MCIM05 / WG_Medicaid_Immigrant_05: a binary variable indicating whether the state provides 
coverage for pregnant women who are LPRs during the 5-year ban. The variable takes on 
a value of 0 if the state does not provide this coverage (n = 474) and a value of 1 if they 
do (n = 393).  
MCIM06 / WG_Medicaid_Immigrant_06: a binary variable indicating whether a state provides 
coverage for pregnant women who are in the country unlawfully. This variable takes on a 
value of 0 if unlawfully present pregnant women are not eligible for coverage (n = 623) 
and a value of 1 if they are eligible (n = 244).  
MCIM07 / WG_Medicaid_Immigrant_07: a binary variable indicating whether a state provides 
Medicaid to LPRs after the 5-year ban expires. This variable takes on a value of 0 if they 
do not provide coverage (n = 121) and a value of 1 if they do provide it (n = 746).  
MCBOP1: a categorical variable indicating whether the medical/surgical services of a dentist are 
covered. This variable takes on a value of 0 if the services are not covered (n = 0), a value 
of 1 if services are covered but require a copay (n = 308), and a value of 2 if the services 
are covered and do not require a copay (n = 508).  
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MCBOP2: a categorical variable indicating whether the podiatrist services are covered. This 
variable takes on a value of 0 if the services are not covered (n = 104), a value of 1 if 
services are covered but require a copay (n = 402), and a value of 2 if the services are 
covered and do not require a copay (n = 304). 
MCBOP3: a categorical variable indicating whether occupational therapy services are covered. 
This variable takes on a value of 0 if the services are not covered (n = 308), a value of 1 if 
services are covered but require a copay (n = 192), and a value of 2 if the services are 
covered and do not require a copay (n = 316). 
MCBOP4: a categorical variable indicating whether physical therapy services are covered. This 
variable takes on a value of 0 if the services are not covered (n = 250), a value of 1 if 
services are covered but require a copay (n = 193), and a value of 2 if the services are 
covered and do not require a copay (n = 373). 
MCBOP5: a categorical variable indicating whether eyeglasses and other visual aids are covered. 
This variable takes on a value of 0 if they are not covered (n = 138), a value of 1 if they 
are covered but require a copay (n = 226), and a value of 2 if they are covered and do not 
require a copay (n = 452). 
MCBOP6: a categorical variable indicating whether dental services are covered. This variable 
takes on a value of 0 if the services are not covered (n = 79), a value of 1 if services are 
covered but require a copay (n = 334), and a value of 2 if the services are covered and do 
not require a copay (n = 403).   
MCBOP7: a categorical variable indicating whether prosthetic and orthotic devices are covered. 
This variable takes on a value of 0 if they are not covered (n = 26), a value of 1 if they are 
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covered but require a copay (n = 184), and a value of 2 if they are covered and do not 
require a copay (n = 606).   
MCBOP8: a categorical variable indicating whether services in institutions for mental diseases 
for those 65 and older are covered. This variable takes on a value of 0 if the services are 
not covered (n = 94), a value of 1 if services are covered but require a copay (n = 37), 
and a value of 2 if the services are covered and do not require a copay (n = 685).   
MCBOP9: a categorical variable indicating whether target case management services are 
covered. This variable takes on a value of 0 if the services are not covered (n = 36), a 
value of 1 if services are covered but require a copay (n = 15), and a value of 2 if the 
services are covered and do not require a copay (n = 765).   
MCBOP10: a categorical variable indicating whether hearing aids and other hearing devices are 
covered. This variable takes on a value of 0 if they are not covered (n = 303), a value of 1 
if they are covered but require a copay (n = 130), and a value of 2 if they are covered and 
do not require a copay (n = 383).   
MCBOP11: a categorical variable indicating whether chiropractic services are covered. This 
variable takes on a value of 0 if the services are not covered (n = 401), a value of 1 if 
services are covered but require a copay (n = 263), and a value of 2 if the services are 
covered and do not require a copay (n = 152).   
MCBOP12: a categorical variable indicating whether psychological services are covered. This 
variable takes on a value of 0 if the services are not covered (n = 269), a value of 1 if 
services are covered but require a copay (n = 198), and a value of 2 if the services are 
covered and do not require a copay (n = 349).   
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MCBOP13: a categorical variable indicating whether hospice care is covered. This variable takes 
on a value of 0 if it is not covered (n = 179), a value of 1 if it is covered but require a 
copay (n = 60), and a value of 2 if it is covered and do not require a copay (n = 577).   
MCBOP14: a categorical variable indicating whether dentures are covered. This variable takes 
on a value of 0 if they are not covered (n = 295), a value of 1 if they are covered but 
require a copay (n = 123), and a value of 2 if they are covered and do not require a copay 
(n = 398).   
MCBOP15: a categorical variable indicating whether rehabilitation services for mental health 
and substance use are covered. This variable takes on a value of 0 if the services are not 
covered (n = 31), a value of 1 if services are covered but require a copay (n = 178), and a 
value of 2 if the services are covered and do not require a copay (n = 607).   
MCBOP16: a categorical variable indicating whether nurse practitioner services are covered. 
This variable takes on a value of 0 if the services are not covered (n = 7), a value of 1 if 
services are covered but require a copay (n = 361), and a value of 2 if the services are 
covered and do not require a copay (n = 448).   
MCBOP17: a categorical variable indicating whether private duty nursing services are covered. 
This variable takes on a value of 0 if the services are not covered (n = 444), a value of 1 
if services are covered but require a copay (n = 19), and a value of 2 if the services are 
covered and do not require a copay (n = 353).   
MCBOP18: a categorical variable indicating whether services for speech, hearing and language 
disorders are covered. This variable takes on a value of 0 if the services are not covered 
(n = 262), a value of 1 if services are covered but require a copay (n = 200), and a value 
of 2 if the services are covered and do not require a copay (n = 354).   
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MCBOP19: a categorical variable indicating whether personal care services are covered. This 
variable takes on a value of 0 if the services are not covered (n = 313), a value of 1 if 
services are covered but require a copay (n = 24), and a value of 2 if the services are 
covered and do not require a copay (n = 479).   
MCBOP20: a categorical variable indicating whether intermediate care facility services for 
individuals with intellectual disabilities are covered. This variable takes on a value of 0 if 
the services are not covered (n = 33), a value of 1 if services are covered but require a 
copay (n = 8), and a value of 2 if the services are covered and do not require a copay  
(n = 775).   
MCBOP21: a categorical variable indicating whether medical equipment and supplies other than 
those from home health are covered. This variable takes on a value of 0 if they are not 
covered (n = 10), a value of 1 if they are covered but require a copay (n = 258), and a 
value of 2 if they are covered and do not require a copay (n = 548).   
MCBOP22: a categorical variable indicating whether optometrist services are covered. This 
variable takes on a value of 0 if the services are not covered (n = 8), a value of 1 if 
services are covered but require a copay (n = 447), and a value of 2 if the services are 
covered and do not require a copay (n = 361).   
MCBOPAV: a continuous variable indicating the average of a state-year’s values for the 
variables MCBOP1-MCBOP22. This variable provides information on how many 
optional benefits a state covers and how well they cover them.  
MCMANDA: a categorical variable indicating whether diagnostic screening and preventive 
services are covered. This variable takes on a value of 0 if the services are not covered (n 
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= 136), a value of 1 if services are covered but require a copay (n = 108), and a value of 
2 if the services are covered and do not require a copay (n = 572). 
MCMANDB: a categorical variable indicating whether rural health clinic services are covered. 
This variable takes on a value of 0 if the services are not covered (n = 61), a value of 1 if 
services are covered but require a copay (n = 423), and a value of 2 if the services are 
covered and do not require a copay (n = 332). 
MCMAND1: a binary variable indicating whether nurse/midwife services require a copay. This 
variable takes on a value of 0 if the services do require a copay (n = 225), and a value of 
1 if they do not have a copay (n = 591).  
MCMAND2: a binary variable indicating whether outpatient hospital services require a copay. 
This variable takes on a value of 0 if the services do require a copay (n = 544), and a 
value of 1 if they do not have a copay (n = 272).  
MCMAND3: a binary variable indicating whether nonemergency medical transportation services 
require a copay. This variable takes on a value of 0 if the services do require a copay (n = 
94), and a value of 1 if they do not have a copay (n = 722).  
MCMAND4: a binary variable indicating whether federally qualified health center services 
require a copay. This variable takes on a value of 0 if the services do require a copay (n = 
416), and a value of 1 if they do not have a copay (n = 400).  
MCMAND5: a binary variable indicating whether nursing facility services other than in 
institutions for mental diseases require a copay. This variable takes on a value of 0 if the 
services do require a copay (n = 20), and a value of 1 if they do not have a copay  
(n = 796).  
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MCMAND6: a binary variable indicating whether physician services require a copay. This 
variable takes on a value of 0 if the services do require a copay (n = 606), and a value of 
1 if they do not have a copay (n = 210).  
MCMAND7: a binary variable indicating whether inpatient hospital services other than in 
institutions for mental disease require a copay. This variable takes on a value of 0 if the 
services do require a copay (n = 437), and a value of 1 if they do not have a copay (n = 
379).  
MCMAND8: a binary variable indicating whether ambulance services require a copay. This 
variable takes on a value of 0 if the services do require a copay (n = 127), and a value of 
1 if they do not have a copay (n = 689).  
MCMAND9: a binary variable indicating whether home health nursing services require a copay. 
This variable takes on a value of 0 if the services do require a copay (n = 183), and a 
value of 1 if they do not have a copay (n = 633).  
MCMAND10: a binary variable indicating whether laboratory and x-ray services outside of a 
hospital require a copay. This variable takes on a value of 0 if the services do require a 
copay (n = 172), and a value of 1 if they do not have a copay (n = 644).  
MCMANDCO: a categorical variable indicating how many mandatory services require a copay. 
A higher number of services that require a copay indicates less generosity; therefore, the 
numbers are inverted so that a state-year in which all 12 mandatory services require a 
copay will take on a value of 0 and a state-year in which none of these services require a 
copay will take on a value of 12.  
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MCRX: a binary variable indicating whether prescription drugs require a copay. This variable 
takes on a value of 0 if they do require a copay (n = 156), and a value of 1 if there is no 
copay (n = 660).  
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APPENDIX 2: NAÏVE INDEX SCORES OVER TIME BY STATE 
Figures A.2.1–A.2.51 Total, SNAP, TANF and Medicaid Generosity, 2004–2016 
All graphs are shown on the same scale to aid in comparison across states.  
Figure A.2.1 Alabama Generosity 2004–2016 
 
Note. SNAP = Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program; TANF = Temporary 
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Figure A.2.2 Alaska Generosity 2004–2016 
 
Note. SNAP = Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program; TANF = Temporary 
Assistance to Needy Families. 
 
Figure A.2.3 Arizona Generosity 2004–2016 
 
Note. SNAP = Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program; TANF = Temporary 
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Figure A.2.4 Arkansas Generosity 2004–2016 
 
Note. SNAP = Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program; TANF = Temporary Assistance to 
Needy Families. 
 
Figure A.2.5 California Generosity 2004–2016 
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Figure A.2.6 Colorado Generosity 2004–2016 
 
Note. SNAP = Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program; TANF = Temporary Assistance to 
Needy Families. 
 
Figure A.2.7 Connecticut Generosity 2004–2016 
 
Note. SNAP = Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program; TANF = Temporary 
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Figure A.2.8 Delaware Generosity 2004–2016 
 
Note. SNAP = Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program; TANF = Temporary 
Assistance to Needy Families. 
 
Figure A.2.9 District of Columbia Generosity 2004–2016 
 
Note. SNAP = Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program; TANF = Temporary 
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Figure A.2.10 Florida Generosity 2004–2016 
 
Note. SNAP = Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program; TANF = Temporary 
Assistance to Needy Families. 
 
Figure A.2.11 Georgia Generosity 2004–2016 
 
Note. SNAP = Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program; TANF = Temporary 
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Figure A.2.12 Hawaii Generosity 2004–2016 
 
Note. SNAP = Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program; TANF = Temporary 
Assistance to Needy Families. 
 
Figure A.2.13 Idaho Generosity 2004–2016 
 
Note. SNAP = Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program; TANF = Temporary 








Total Generosity SNAP Generosity








Total Generosity SNAP Generosity
TANF Generosity Medicaid Generosity
 
 171 
Figure A.2.14 Illinois Generosity 2004–2016 
 
Note. SNAP = Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program; TANF = Temporary 
Assistance to Needy Families. 
 
Figure A.2.15 Indiana Generosity 2004–2016 
 
Note. SNAP = Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program; TANF = Temporary 
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Figure A.2.16 Iowa Generosity 2004–2016 
 
Note. SNAP = Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program; TANF = Temporary 
Assistance to Needy Families. 
 
Figure A.2.17 Kansas Generosity 2004–2016 
 
Note. SNAP = Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program; TANF = Temporary 
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Figure A.2.18 Kentucky Generosity 2004–2016 
 
Note. SNAP = Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program; TANF = Temporary 
Assistance to Needy Families. 
 
Figure A.2.19 Louisiana Generosity 2004–2016 
 
Note. SNAP = Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program; TANF = Temporary 
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Figure A.2.20 Maine Generosity 2004–2016 
 
Note. SNAP = Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program; TANF = Temporary 
Assistance to Needy Families. 
 
Figure A.2.21 Maryland Generosity 2004–2016 
 
Note. SNAP = Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program; TANF = Temporary 
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Figure A.2.22 Massachusetts Generosity 2004–2016 
 
Note. SNAP = Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program; TANF = Temporary 
Assistance to Needy Families. 
 
Figure A.2.23 Michigan Generosity 2004–2016 
 
Note. SNAP = Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program; TANF = Temporary 
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Figure A.2.24 Minnesota Generosity 2004–2016 
 
Note. SNAP = Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program; TANF = Temporary 
Assistance to Needy Families. 
 
Figure A.2.25 Mississippi Generosity 2004–2016 
 
Note. SNAP = Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program; TANF = Temporary 
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Figure A.2.26 Missouri Generosity 2004–2016 
 
Note. SNAP = Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program; TANF = Temporary 
Assistance to Needy Families. 
 
Figure A.2.27 Montana Generosity 2004–2016 
 
Note. SNAP = Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program; TANF = Temporary 








Total Generosity SNAP Generosity








Total Generosity SNAP Generosity
TANF Generosity Medicaid Generosity
 
 178 
Figure A.2.28 Nebraska Generosity 2004–2016 
 
Note. SNAP = Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program; TANF = Temporary 
Assistance to Needy Families. 
 
Figure A.2.29 Nevada Generosity 2004–2016 
 
Note. SNAP = Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program; TANF = Temporary 
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Figure A.2.30 New Hampshire Generosity 2004–2016 
 
Note. SNAP = Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program; TANF = Temporary 
Assistance to Needy Families. 
 
Figure A.2.31 New Jersey Generosity 2004–2016 
 
Note. SNAP = Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program; TANF = Temporary 
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Figure A.2.32 New Mexico Generosity 2004–2016 
 
Note. SNAP = Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program; TANF = Temporary 
Assistance to Needy Families. 
 
Figure A.2.33 New York Generosity 2004–2016 
 
Note. SNAP = Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program; TANF = Temporary 
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Figure A.2.34 North Carolina Generosity 2004–2016 
 
Note. SNAP = Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program; TANF = Temporary 
Assistance to Needy Families. 
 
Figure A.2.35 North Dakota Generosity 2004–2016 
 
Note. SNAP = Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program; TANF = Temporary 
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Figure A.2.36 Ohio Generosity 2004–2016 
 
Note. SNAP = Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program; TANF = Temporary 
Assistance to Needy Families. 
 
Figure A.2.37 Oklahoma Generosity 2004–2016 
 
Note. SNAP = Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program; TANF = Temporary 
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Figure A.2.38 Oregon Generosity 2004–2016 
 
Note. SNAP = Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program; TANF = Temporary 
Assistance to Needy Families. 
 
Figure A.2.39 Pennsylvania Generosity 2004–2016 
 
Note. SNAP = Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program; TANF = Temporary 
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Figure A.2.40 Rhode Island Generosity 2004–2016 
 
Note. SNAP = Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program; TANF = Temporary 
Assistance to Needy Families. 
 
Figure A.2.41 South Carolina Generosity 2004–2016 
 
Note. SNAP = Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program; TANF = Temporary 
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Figure A.2.42 South Dakota Generosity 2004–2016 
 
Note. SNAP = Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program; TANF = Temporary 
Assistance to Needy Families. 
 
Figure A.2.43 Tennessee Generosity 2004–2016 
 
Note. SNAP = Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program; TANF = Temporary 
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Figure A.2.44 Texas Generosity 2004–2016 
 
Note. SNAP = Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program; TANF = Temporary 
Assistance to Needy Families. 
 
Figure A.2.45 Utah Generosity 2004–2016 
 
Note. SNAP = Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program; TANF = Temporary 
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Figure A.2.46 Vermont Generosity 2004–2016 
 
Note. SNAP = Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program; TANF = Temporary 
Assistance to Needy Families. 
 
Figure A.2.47 Virginia Generosity 2004–2016 
 
Note. SNAP = Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program; TANF = Temporary 
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Figure A.2.48 Washington Generosity 2004–2016 
 
Note. SNAP = Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program; TANF = Temporary 
Assistance to Needy Families. 
 
Figure A.2.49 West Virginia Generosity 2004–2016 
 
Note. SNAP = Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program; TANF = Temporary 
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Figure A.2.50 Wisconsin Generosity 2004–2016 
 
Note. SNAP = Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program; TANF = Temporary 
Assistance to Needy Families. 
 
Figure A.2.51 Wyoming Generosity 2004–2016 
 
Note. SNAP = Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program; TANF = Temporary 
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Figure A.2.52 Average SNAP Generosity Score by State, 2004–2016 
 
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure A.2.53 Average TANF Generosity Score by State, 2004–2016  
 



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































APPENDIX 3: MULTILEVEL MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD ESTIMATION RESULTS, 
MMR OF RESIDENTS OF A STATE 
Table A.3.1 Results for Extended Maternal Mortality 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
MMR1 MMR1 MMR1 MMR1 MMR1 
Generosity -0.102 
    
 
(0.112) 
    
Revised 18.19*** 17.91*** 18.10*** 17.82*** 18.05*** 
 
(1.870) (1.870) (1.789) (1.834) (1.854) 
High BMI 1.242*** 1.225*** 1.224*** 1.168*** 1.218*** 
 




















   
-0.0331 0.00466 
    
(0.112) (0.118) 
_Cons -11.38 -14.80* -6.409 -12.64 -6.603 
 
(7.911) (6.992) (8.106) (10.16) (10.91) 
Χ2 137.60*** 136.38*** 142.34*** 136.34*** 142.34*** 
R2 .30916168 .30337006 .3258253 .30374207 .3256912 
Note. N = 408. BMI = body mass index; MMR = maternal mortality ratio; SNAP = Supplemental Nutrition 
Assistance Program; TANF = Temporary Assistance to Needy Families. Standard errors in parentheses. 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001  
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Table A.3.2 Results for Limited Maternal Mortality  
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
MMR2 MMR2 MMR2 MMR2 MMR2 
Generosity -0.192** 
    
 
(0.0701) 
    
Revised 10.48*** 10.29*** 9.801*** 9.919*** 10.43*** 
 
(1.187) (1.200) (1.165) (1.179) (1.190) 
Black population 29.74*** 30.28*** 27.43*** 28.41*** 29.27*** 
 




















   
-0.105 -0.0669 
    
(0.0628) (0.0633) 
_Cons 16.06*** 10.50*** 12.35*** 12.54*** 16.99*** 
 
(3.589) (2.128) (3.298) (3.618) (4.291) 
Χ2 95.55*** 90.34*** 88.61*** 87.39*** 95.93*** 
R2 .27267447 .26301854 .26018157 .25731159 .27333596 
Note. N = 408. BMI = body mass index; MMR = maternal mortality ratio; SNAP = Supplemental Nutrition 
Assistance Program; TANF = Temporary Assistance to Needy Families.Standard errors in parentheses. 




Table A.3.3 Results for Extended White Maternal Mortality  
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
White MMR1 White MMR1 White MMR1 White MMR1 White MMR1 
Generosity -0.0404 
    
 
(0.113) 
    
Revised 17.27*** 16.99*** 17.42*** 17.12*** 17.18*** 
 
(1.897) (1.896) (1.811) (1.863) (1.870) 
High BMI 1.044*** 1.007*** 1.041*** 1.019*** 0.980** 
 




















   
-0.0112 -0.00690 
    
(0.109) (0.115) 
_Cons -12.28 -13.87* -6.370 -13.02 -5.569 
 
(8.101) (6.984) (8.107) (10.26) (10.90) 
Χ2 114.77*** 114.32*** 119.59*** 114.42*** 120.04*** 
R2 .27703009 .27358113 .29500273 .27481424 .29569936 
Note. N = 408. BMI = body mass index; MMR = maternal mortality ratio; SNAP = Supplemental Nutrition 
Assistance Program; TANF = Temporary Assistance to Needy Families. Standard errors in parentheses. 




Table A.3.4 Results for Limited White Maternal Mortality  
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
White MMR2 White MMR2 White MMR2 White MMR2 White MMR2 
Generosity -0.249*** 
    
 
(0.0712) 
    
Revised 8.761*** 8.437*** 8.095*** 8.279*** 8.691*** 
 




















   
-0.145* -0.101 
    
(0.0606) (0.0599) 
_Cons 20.33*** 12.48*** 15.95*** 15.86*** 22.69*** 
 
(3.642) (2.190) (3.041) (3.403) (4.059) 
Χ2 57.62*** 47.42*** 51.90*** 49.25*** 60.92*** 
R2 .16108253 .13751938 .15002453 .14394409 .1675403 
Note. N = 408. MMR = maternal mortality ratio; SNAP = Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program; TANF = 
Temporary Assistance to Needy Families. Standard errors in parentheses. 




Table A.3.5 Results for Extended Black Maternal Mortality 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
Black MMR1 Black MMR1 Black MMR1 Black MMR1 Black MMR1 
Generosity 0.288 
    
 
(0.253) 
    
Revised 23.85*** 24.55*** 24.92*** 24.08*** 23.75*** 
 
(4.144) (4.122) (4.034) (4.035) (4.121) 
High BMI 1.506** 1.412* 1.506** 1.893** 1.797** 
 




















   
0.289 0.255 
    
(0.221) (0.239) 
_Cons -22.08 -10.21 -13.79 -33.95 -33.76 
 
(19.44) (15.68) (18.06) (24.76) (25.38) 
Χ2 52.60*** 51.23*** 50.99*** 53.33*** 53.57*** 
R2 .21561217 .20685718 .20519614 .22030113 .22137025 
Note. N = 254. BMI = body mass index; MMR = maternal mortality ratio; SNAP = Supplemental Nutrition 
Assistance Program; TANF = Temporary Assistance to Needy Families. Standard errors in parentheses. 




Table A.3.6 Results for Limited Black Maternal Mortality  
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
Black MMR2 Black MMR2 Black MMR2 Black MMR2 Black MMR2 
Generosity 0.260 
    
 
(0.209) 
    
Revised 15.52*** 15.99*** 16.40*** 16.38*** 15.53*** 
 




















   
0.119 0.0852 
    
(0.163) (0.166) 
_Cons 12.59 20.04** 18.73* 18.96* 11.98 
 
(10.72) (6.372) (8.884) (9.339) (11.79) 
Χ2 28.28*** 27.37*** 27.07*** 26.98*** 28.32*** 
R2 .1317627 .12482202 .12365505 .12382123 .13198761 
Note. N = 254. MMR = maternal mortality ratio; SNAP = Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program; TANF = 
Temporary Assistance to Needy Families. Standard errors in parentheses. 
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